Martin Heidegger (26 September 1889 – 26 May 1976) was a German philosopher whose contributions were foundational to the emergence of phenomenology, hermeneutics, and existentialism. His influence extended significantly across subsequent philosophical discourse, the social sciences, humanities, and theology.
Martin Heidegger (26 September 1889 – 26 May 1976) was a German philosopher whose work was central to the development of phenomenology, hermeneutics, and existentialism. He has had significant impact within subsequent philosophy, social sciences and humanities, and theology.
Heidegger's seminal work, Being and Time (1927), is broadly recognized as a cornerstone of modern philosophical thought. Within this text, he articulated the concept of Dasein ("being-there") to characterize the unique nature of human existence, positing that individuals possess a "pre-ontological" comprehension of being that fundamentally influences their modes of living and acting. This understanding was meticulously examined through the lens of the unified structure of "being-in-the-world." By scrutinizing Dasein, Heidegger aimed to reinvigorate what he termed "the question of being": the foundational investigation into the intelligibility of entities as they are. This central inquiry, he contended, had been largely overlooked or obscured throughout the trajectory of Western philosophy since antiquity.
Subsequently, his philosophical focus shifted towards inquiries into technology, language, art, and poetry, wherein he elaborated on themes of human "dwelling" within the world and critically assessed what he perceived as the nihilistic progression of modern technological civilization. Prominent thinkers, including Jean-Paul Sartre, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida, and Richard Rorty, were profoundly influenced by their engagement with his ideas, whether through affirmation or critique.
Heidegger's enduring legacy is significantly complicated by his association with National Socialism. In April 1933, he assumed the rectorship of the University of Freiburg and became a member of the Nazi Party, an affiliation he maintained until 1945. The precise nature and depth of his adherence to Nazism, alongside the debate regarding an intrinsic link between his philosophical tenets and his political decisions, persist as areas of considerable academic contention. Post-war, he faced a teaching prohibition following denazification processes; this ban was rescinded in 1949, enabling his return to lecturing at the University of Freiburg. Despite this enforced hiatus, he sustained his intellectual impact through private seminars and discussions conducted at his residence. His consistent reluctance to publicly disavow his Nazi affiliations or articulate unequivocal remorse continues to pose challenges for scholars interpreting his oeuvre.
Early Life
Born on 26 September 1889, Heidegger originated from rural Meßkirch, Baden, the son of Johanna (Kempf) and Friedrich Heidegger. His father served as the sexton of the local church, and Martin was brought up within the Catholic faith.
Heidegger commenced his priestly formation in 1903. In 1909, he enrolled in a Jesuit seminary but was discharged within weeks due to a cardiac condition. During this period, he first encountered the writings of Franz Brentano. Subsequently, he pursued studies in theology and scholastic philosophy at the University of Freiburg.
By 1911, he discontinued his priestly training, redirecting his academic focus toward contemporary philosophy, notably Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations. In 1914, he earned his degree with a thesis on psychologism, titled The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism: A Critical-theoretical Contribution to Logic. The subsequent year, he finalized his habilitation thesis concerning Duns Scotus, a work supervised by the neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert and informed by Husserl's phenomenological approach. This thesis is known in English as Duns Scotus's Doctrine of Categories and Meaning.
On 23 June 1916, he unsuccessfully sought a (Catholic) philosophy position at the University of Freiburg, notwithstanding Heinrich Finke's endorsement. Consequently, he initially served as an unsalaried Privatdozent before enlisting as a soldier during the concluding year of World War I. His military service spanned the final ten months of the conflict, predominantly within a meteorological unit on the Western Front, having been deemed unsuitable for combat duty.
Between 1919 and 1923, Heidegger delivered lectures at the University of Freiburg. During this period, he also served as an assistant to Edmund Husserl, who had held a professorship at the institution since 1916.
Marburg
In 1923, Heidegger was elected to an extraordinary professorship in philosophy at the University of Marburg. Notable colleagues at the institution comprised Rudolf Bultmann, Nicolai Hartmann, Paul Tillich, and Paul Natorp. Among his students at Marburg were Hans-Georg Gadamer, Helene Weiss, Karl Löwith, Hannah Arendt, Gerhard Krüger, Leo Strauss, Jacob Klein, Günther Anders, and Hans Jonas. Drawing inspiration from Aristotle, his lectures initiated the development of his central philosophical inquiry: the question concerning the meaning of being. He expanded the notion of the subject to encompass historical and concrete existential dimensions, identifying precursors to these ideas in Christian thinkers such as Paul of Tarsus, Augustine of Hippo, Martin Luther, and Søren Kierkegaard. His intellectual engagement also extended to the writings of Wilhelm Dilthey, Husserl, Max Scheler, and Friedrich Nietzsche.
In 1927, Heidegger released his seminal work, Sein und Zeit (Being and Time). His immediate objective was to secure a full professorship. However, the publication transcended this initial aim, elevating him to a status of international intellectual prominence.
Freiburg
Upon Husserl's retirement from his philosophy professorship in 1928, Heidegger accepted the University of Freiburg's invitation to succeed him, despite receiving a competing offer from Marburg. His inaugural lecture in 1929 was titled "What is Metaphysics?" That same year, he also published Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.
Heidegger resided in Freiburg im Breisgau for the remainder of his life, rejecting subsequent academic appointments, notably one from Humboldt University of Berlin. Among his students at Freiburg were Hannah Arendt, Günther Anders, Hans Jonas, Karl Löwith, Charles Malik, Herbert Marcuse, and Ernst Nolte. Emmanuel Levinas participated in his lecture courses during his 1928 residency in Freiburg, as did Jan Patočka in 1933; Patočka, specifically, experienced profound intellectual influence from Heidegger.
Heidegger was elected rector of the university on April 21, 1933, subsequently joining the Nazi Party on May 1, merely three months after Adolf Hitler's appointment as chancellor. Throughout his tenure as rector, he functioned as both a member and an ardent proponent of the party. Ongoing scholarly debate persists regarding the interrelationship between his philosophical work and his political commitment to Nazism. He sought to establish himself as the party's designated philosopher; however, the profoundly abstract character of his philosophy, coupled with the opposition from Alfred Rosenberg—who harbored similar aspirations—constrained Heidegger's influence. Historians suggest that his resignation from the rectorship stemmed more from administrative frustrations than from any fundamental ideological disagreement with the Nazis. During his inaugural address as rector on May 27, he articulated support for a German revolution, and in a contemporaneous article and student speech, he also publicly endorsed Adolf Hitler. In November 1933, Heidegger affixed his signature to the Vow of allegiance of the Professors of the German Universities and High-Schools to Adolf Hitler and the National Socialistic State. Heidegger relinquished the rectorate in April 1934, subsequently pursuing a pedagogical agenda consistent with Nazi cultural policies until 1945.
In 1935, he delivered the lecture titled "The Origin of the Work of Art". The following year, during his time in Rome, Heidegger presented his initial lecture on Friedrich Hölderlin. Between 1936 and 1937, Heidegger authored a text widely regarded by some scholars as his second most significant work, Contributions to Philosophy; however, this work remained unpublished until 1989, thirteen years post-mortem.
Between 1936 and 1940, Heidegger also presented a series of lectures at Freiburg concerning Friedrich Nietzsche, which provided substantial foundational material for his more developed works and ideas of that era. These lectures were subsequently published in 1961. This timeframe additionally signifies the genesis of his inquiry into the "essence of technology".
During the autumn of 1944, Heidegger was conscripted into the Volkssturm and tasked with excavating anti-tank trenches along the Rhine River.
Post-war
In late 1946, as France implemented épuration légale within its occupation zone, French military authorities determined that Heidegger should be prohibited from academic instruction or involvement in university affairs due to his affiliation with the Nazi Party. Despite this prohibition, he delivered the lecture "What are Poets for?" in commemoration of Rilke. He also published "On Humanism" in 1947 to delineate his philosophical distinctions from Jean-Paul Sartre and French existentialism. The denazification process concerning Heidegger persisted until March 1949, when he was ultimately classified as a Mitläufer, representing the second-lowest tier among five categories of culpability for Nazi regime association. No punitive actions were subsequently recommended against him. This decision facilitated his reinstatement to an academic position at Freiburg University for the winter semester of 1950–51. He subsequently attained emeritus status and lectured consistently from 1951 to 1958, continuing by invitation until 1967.
In 1966, he provided an interview to Der Spiegel, in which he sought to rationalize his endorsement of the Nazi Party. In accordance with a prior arrangement, this interview remained unpublished until five days following his demise in 1976, appearing under the title "Only a God Can Save Us," a phrase derived from a reference to Hölderlin made by Heidegger during the discussion.
Heidegger's publications during this period primarily consisted of revised editions of his lecture courses. Towards the end of his life, he also initiated the compilation and publication of a comprehensive edition of his writings, known as the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe. The inaugural volume was released in 1975. This extensive collection comprises 106 volumes and is projected to be fully completed by October 2025.
Martin Heidegger passed away peacefully in his sleep on the morning of May 26, 1976, at the age of 86, at his residence in Freiburg. His interment occurred two days subsequently in his hometown of Meßkirch, West Germany, where he was laid to rest alongside his parents in the village cemetery he had frequented daily during his commute to school. His tombstone bears the inscription of a solitary star, symbolizing a statement he penned in 1947: "To think is to confine yourself to a single thought that one day stands still like a star in the world’s sky."
Early Intellectual Influences
Edmund Husserl, the progenitor of phenomenology, served as Heidegger's mentor and exerted a profound impact on his philosophical development. Although the precise contours of this influence continue to be debated among scholars, it is evident that Heidegger's seminal work, Being and Time, diverged from Husserl's theory of intentionality, instead emphasizing the pre-theoretical prerequisites that facilitate conscious apprehension of objects.
Aristotle's philosophy exerted an early and significant influence on Heidegger. This intellectual lineage was transmitted via Catholic theology, medieval philosophical traditions, and the work of Franz Brentano. Scholar Michael Wheeler posits that Heidegger's replacement of Husserl's concept of intentionality with his unified notion of being-in-the-world stems from a "radical rethinking" of Aristotle's Metaphysics. Within this reinterpretation, diverse modalities of being are synthesized into a more fundamental capacity for 'taking-as' or 'making-present-to'.
Wilhelm Dilthey's writings significantly influenced Heidegger's nascent endeavor to formulate a "hermeneutics of factical life" and his subsequent hermeneutical reorientation of phenomenology. It is widely acknowledged that Heidegger adopted and adapted Dilthey's hermeneutical framework. Heidegger's innovative ontological concepts necessitated a gestalt formation, rather than a mere sequence of logical propositions, to illustrate his profoundly novel intellectual paradigm; consequently, the hermeneutic circle provided a potent new instrument for articulating and actualizing these concepts.
Søren Kierkegaard's philosophy significantly informed Heidegger's exploration of existentialist themes, particularly those presented in Division II of Being and Time. Heidegger's notions of anxiety (Angst) and mortality are demonstrably influenced by Kierkegaard, owing much to the latter's articulation of the significance of subjective truth, human existence confronted by death, the temporal nature of being, and the imperative for a fervent affirmation of individual being-in-the-world.
Philosophy
Fundamental Ontology
Scholar Taylor Carman notes that traditional ontology investigates "Why is there anything?", whereas Heidegger's fundamental ontology addresses "What does it mean for something to be?" Heidegger's ontological framework is considered fundamental relative to traditional ontology because it explores the essential presuppositions underlying any comprehension of entities, specifically, our understanding of that which constitutes entities.
This line of inquiry holds a central position in Heidegger's philosophy. He critiques the Western philosophical tradition for erroneously attempting to conceptualize being as such as if it were a supreme entity. Heidegger redefines traditional ontology by shifting the focus to the meaning of being. He asserts that this specific type of ontological investigation is indispensable for grasping the foundational principles of human understanding, encompassing both scientific and other forms of knowledge.
In essence, Heidegger posits that before one can inquire into what exists, it is imperative to first ascertain the fundamental meaning of "to exist."
Being and Time
In his seminal work, Being and Time, Heidegger pursues this ontological inquiry through an analysis of human existence, specifically recognizing humans as beings capable of posing the question concerning the meaning of being. Canadian philosopher Sean McGrath suggests that Heidegger's approach in this regard was likely influenced by Scotus. Within this phenomenological context, Heidegger designates human being as Dasein.
This methodological approach is effective because Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of being inherently shapes experience. Dasein's ordinary, even mundane, experience of "being-in-the-world" provides direct "access to the meaning" or "sense of being," which refers to the conceptual framework through which "something becomes intelligible as something." Heidegger proposes that this common "prescientific" understanding precedes more abstract modes of cognition, such as logic or theoretical frameworks. Being and Time aims to demonstrate how this implicit understanding can be progressively elucidated through the methodologies of phenomenology and hermeneutics.
Being-in-the-world
Heidegger introduces the term Dasein to signify a "living being" defined by its activity of "being there." Conceptualized as a unified phenomenon rather than a contingent, additive composite, Dasein is characterized by Heidegger as "being-in-the-world."
Heidegger emphasizes that the "in" within Dasein's "being-in-the-world" signifies involvement or engagement, rather than objective, physical containment. The manner in which Dasein is "in" the world corresponds to "residing" or "dwelling" within it. Heidegger illustrates this with examples such as "having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something."
Just as "being-in" does not denote objective, physical enclosedness, the term "world," as employed by Heidegger, does not refer to a universe composed solely of physical objects. The world, in Heidegger's conceptualization, is understood in relation to human possibilities: entities present themselves to individuals in terms of their projects and the uses to which they can be put. The "sight" through which individuals apprehend equipment is not a mentalistic intentionality but what Heidegger terms "circumspection." This implies that equipment reveals itself by its "towards-which," or its functional purpose. In everyday existence, individuals are immersed within the equipmental totality of their work-world. Furthermore, Heidegger's analysis implies a radical holism, asserting in his own words, "there 'is' no such thing as an equipment."
For instance, when an individual sits down to dinner and picks up a fork, they are not merely grasping an object with specific physical properties; rather, they are non-reflectively engaging in an "in-order-to-eat." When equipment functions as expected, it becomes transparent; its use is subsumed under the task for which it is employed. Heidegger designates this structure of practically ordered reference relations as the "worldhood of the world."
Heidegger designates the mode of being for such entities as "ready-to-hand," implying their comprehension solely through practical engagement. However, should an item, such as a plastic fork, fail during its intended use—for instance, by breaking—it transitions into the mode of being Heidegger terms "present-at-hand." At this juncture, the object necessitates focused attention, prompting an evaluation of its inherent properties. Questions arise regarding its usability, such as whether it is irreparably damaged or if an alternative utensil or method of consumption might suffice. While equipmental failure represents a common pathway for objects to manifest as "present-at-hand," Heidegger identifies it as a characteristic illustration of this ontological shift within everyday experience.
Consequently, Heidegger establishes a conceptual framework for the categories of subject and object, yet simultaneously asserts their inapplicability to our most fundamental mode of worldly engagement, positing them instead as derivative constructs.
Heidegger delineates three fundamental structural characteristics of being-in-the-world: understanding, attunement, and discourse. He refers to these attributes as "existentiales" or "existentialia" (Existenzialien) to differentiate their ontological standing from the "categories" typically employed in metaphysics.
- Understanding is characterized as "our fundamental capacity to exist as an individual, to perform actions, and to navigate the world." It constitutes the foundational "know-how" through which Dasein engages in the routine activities comprising daily existence. Heidegger posits that this practical mode of understanding precedes and is more fundamental than theoretical comprehension.
- Attunement signifies "our inherent manner of discovering ourselves situated within the world." Alternative translations include "disposition" or "affectedness." (While the standard translation by Macquarrie and Robinson employs "state-of-mind," this term can erroneously imply a private mental condition.) A precise English equivalent for Heidegger's Befindlichkeit, which is not a common German word, remains elusive. Nevertheless, its essential meaning conveys "being encountered within a context where objects and perspectives inherently hold significance."
- Discourse (alternatively rendered as talk or telling [Rede]) is defined as "the systematic articulation of the world into discernible, communicable structures of meaning." It is intrinsically linked to both understanding and attunement: "The world, revealed through moods and apprehended by understanding, is subsequently structured by discourse. Discourse thereby enables language." Heidegger asserts that "Discourse constitutes the articulation of intelligibility." Fundamentally, this comprehensive referential framework becomes evident in how distinctions are drawn between entities during their practical application.
Heidegger synthesizes these three existential characteristics of Dasein into a unified structure he designates as "care," defined as "ahead-of-itself-being-already-in-(the-world) as being-amidst (entities encountered within-the-world)." The unifying principle of this formulation is temporality. Understanding is inherently directed toward future potentialities, attunement is profoundly influenced by past experiences, and discourse illuminates the present through these temporal dimensions. Consequently, the inquiry into Dasein's being culminates in the concept of time. A substantial portion of Division II of Being and Time is dedicated to a more profound reinterpretation of the conclusions presented in Division I, viewed through the lens of Dasein's temporality.
Das Man
As evinced by the analyses of both attunement and discourse, Dasein is intrinsically, or a priori, a social entity. Within Heidegger's specialized terminology, Dasein is characterized as "Dasein-with" (Mitsein), a concept he posits as equally primordial to "being-one's self" (Selbstsein).
Heidegger designates this existential characteristic of Dasein as das Man, transforming the German pronoun man into a substantive. In English, it is commonly rendered as either "the they" or "the one" (occasionally capitalized), reflecting Heidegger's explanation: "By 'others' we do not mean everyone else but me.... They are rather those from whom for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself—those among whom one is too." Frequently, the term is retained in its original German form.
Philosopher Hubert Dreyfus contends that a central objective of Heidegger's work is to demonstrate that, in contrast to Husserl's phenomenology, individuals do not construct an intersubjective world from their isolated actions; instead, "these activities presuppose the revelation of a singular, shared world." This perspective represents a significant departure for Heidegger from the Cartesian philosophical tradition, which typically commences from the standpoint of individual subjectivity.
Dreyfus contends that the chapter concerning das Man within Being and Time represents its most perplexing section, frequently leading to misinterpretation. He posits that this issue arises from Heidegger's synthesis of two divergent philosophical currents. The initial influence stems from Dilthey's perspective on how public and historical environments shape the generation of meaning. Conversely, the second influence is Kierkegaard's assertion that genuine truth cannot be discovered within collective consciousness.
Heidegger's analysis, through its Diltheyian aspect, establishes das Man as ontologically existential, paralleling concepts such as understanding, affectedness, and discourse. This analytical facet elucidates how a socio-historical "background" facilitates the emergence of specific meanings for entities and actions. Philosopher Charles Taylor elaborates on this concept, stating: "It is that of which I am not simply unaware... but at the same time I cannot be said to be explicitly or focally aware of it, because that status is already occupied by what it is making intelligible". Consequently, this background implicitly shapes and enables active engagement with the world, yet it remains something individuals cannot fully articulate to themselves.
The Kierkegaardian impact on Heidegger's framework introduces a pronounced existentialist element into Being and Time. It is important to note that existentialism, a comprehensive philosophical current primarily articulated by Jean-Paul Sartre, should not be conflated with Heidegger's precise examination of Dasein's specific existential characteristics. The core concept here is authenticity, which arises as a challenge due to the inherent "publicness" embedded within the existential function of das Man. Heidegger himself articulated this as follows:
In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the 'they' is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we read, see and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as they shrink back; we find 'shocking' what they find shocking. The 'they', which is nothing definite, and which we all are, through not as the sum, prescribes the kind of being of everydayness.
This "dictatorship of das Man" poses a significant threat to Heidegger's overarching endeavor to elucidate the meaning of being. From such a state, it appears impossible even to formulate the fundamental question of being that Heidegger aims to investigate. He addresses this critical challenge by developing his concept of authenticity.
Authenticity
Heidegger coined the term Eigentlichkeit, emphasizing its root eigen, which signifies "own." Consequently, this term, commonly rendered as "authenticity," could equally be translated as "ownedness" or "being one's own." Heidegger defines authenticity as the assumption of responsibility for one's being, specifically the stance individuals adopt concerning their fundamental life projects. In his lexicon, it entails adopting a suitably "resolute" position regarding one's "for-the-sake-of-which." Stated otherwise, the "self" to which one remains true in authenticity is not a pre-existing entity awaiting discovery, but rather emerges through "on-going narrative construction."
Scholars Somogy Varga and Charles Guignon delineate three pathways through which Dasein can achieve an authentic relationship with itself, transcending its "fallen" state as a "they"-self. Firstly, an intense emotional state, such as anxiety, can reveal Dasein to itself as an inherently isolated entity. Secondly, a direct encounter with Dasein's "ownmost" potential for mortality can similarly unveil its inherent and irreducible finitude. Thirdly, experiencing "the call of conscience" can expose Dasein's intrinsic "guilt" (Schuld), understood as the obligation it owes to itself for having adopted pre-established possibilities that Dasein is now responsible for upholding.
Philosopher Michael E. Zimmerman characterizes authenticity as "resolving to accept the openness which, paradoxically, one already is." He underscores that this process involves not "intellectual comprehension" but rather "hard-won insight." Ultimately, authenticity entails permitting the ego to be "eclipsed by the manifestation of one's finitude."
Although the term "authenticity" is absent from Heidegger's writing after Being and Time, Zimmerman argues that it is supplanted in his later thought by the less subjective or voluntaristic notion of Ereignis. Heidegger conceptualizes this common German term, meaning "event" or "happening," as the appropriation of Dasein into a cosmic interplay of concealment and appearance.
Subsequent Works: The Concept of the Turn
Heidegger's "Turn," also known by its German designation die Kehre, denotes a transformation in his philosophical output that some commentators trace to as early as 1930, becoming distinctly evident by the 1940s. These scholars variously characterize this development as either a shift in thematic emphasis or a fundamental alteration in perspective.
Heidegger himself frequently employed the term to denote the transition articulated at the conclusion of Being and Time, specifically from "being and time" to "time and being." Nevertheless, he disputed the notion of an abrupt "about-turn'" as proposed by some interpreters. Scholar Michael Inwood further highlights that numerous concepts from Being and Time are preserved, albeit with altered terminology, in his subsequent writings. Additionally, he notes that certain words or expressions consistently used throughout Heidegger's career acquire distinct meanings in his later works.
This alleged transformation, encompassing approximately three decades of Heidegger's four-decade writing career, has been characterized by scholars from diverse perspectives. For example, it is viewed as a progression from dwelling (being) within the world to doing (temporality) within the world. This particular facet, notably articulated in the 1951 essay "Building Dwelling Thinking," has significantly impacted numerous architectural theorists.
Conversely, other interpreters contend that the significance of the Turn may be exaggerated or that it is entirely nonexistent. For example, Thomas Sheehan posits that this alleged alteration is "far less dramatic than usually suggested," representing merely a shift in emphasis and methodology. Mark Wrathall, conversely, asserted that the Turn is absent from Heidegger's texts, characterizing it as a fundamental misconception.
Prominent among his later works are "The Origin of the Work of Art" (1935), Contributions to Philosophy (1937), "Letter on Humanism" (1946), "Building Dwelling Thinking" (1951), "The Question Concerning Technology" (1954), and "What Is Called Thinking?" (1954).
The Historical Trajectory of Being
The philosophical inquiry into the nature of being can be historically linked through Aristotle to Parmenides. Heidegger asserts his intention to reanimate this fundamental inquiry into being, which he contends was largely neglected by the metaphysical tradition spanning from Plato to Descartes. This oversight persisted through the Age of Enlightenment and into the eras of modern science and technology. To facilitate the recovery of this question, Heidegger dedicates substantial scholarly attention to ancient Greek philosophy, particularly the works of Plato, Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Anaximander.
In his later philosophical works, Heidegger endeavors to reconstruct the "history of being" to demonstrate the manner in which various epochs in philosophical history were characterized by distinct conceptualizations of being. His objective is to recover the primordial experience of being, evident in early Greek thought, which he argues was obscured by subsequent philosophers.
W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz indicates that Heidegger maintained that "the thinking of Heraclitus and Parmenides, which lies at the origin of philosophy, was falsified and misinterpreted" by Plato and Aristotle, thereby corrupting the entirety of subsequent Western philosophical tradition. In his Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger asserts, "Among the most ancient Greek thinkers, it is Heraclitus who was subjected to the most fundamentally un-Greek misinterpretation in the course of Western history, and who nevertheless in more recent times has provided the strongest impulses toward redisclosing what is authentically Greek."
Charles Guignon observes that Heidegger endeavors to rectify this misapprehension by reinvigorating Presocratic conceptions of being, with a particular focus on "understanding the way beings show up in (and as) an unfolding happening or event." Guignon further suggests that "this alternative outlook could be termed 'event ontology.'"
The Concept of Language
In Being and Time, language is posited as logically subordinate to Dasein's comprehension of the world and its inherent meaning. Within this framework of worldhood, language is understood to emerge from prelinguistic forms of significance.
After his "turn," Heidegger refined his philosophical stance, positing that certain fundamental terms, such as phusis (a Greek word approximately meaning "nature"), possess a world-disclosing capacity. These terms, he argued, establish the foundational parameters through which Dasein's comprehension manifests in its particular forms. Within this framework, Heidegger famously declared, "Language is the house of being."
Heidegger contended that in the contemporary era, the discourse of "technology," or instrumental reason, diminishes the profound significance of human existence. Consequently, he advocated for poetry as a means of redemption.
Heidegger fundamentally rejected the conceptualization of language as merely a tool for communication. He argued that such a reductionist view would underpin a technological epoch, where digital cognitive processes would exclusively employ language for the organization and transmission of information about existing entities. This calculative and digital mode of thought, he posited, would alienate humanity from language, despite placing humanity at the perceived center of all existence. Heidegger asserted that if individuals presumed to control language as a mere instrument, they would entirely overlook its intrinsic essence: "It is language that speaks, not man. Man only speaks if they neatly correspond to language." Thus, Heidegger emphasized that humanity functions solely as a participant in language, rather than its creator. Individuals are inherently situated within a process of linguistic transmission and can only act in accordance with what language itself articulates.
Nevertheless, Heidegger's perspective here diverges from a philosophy of culture. The tautological expression "language speaks" (German: "die Sprache spricht") serves as his method to ensure that the phenomenon of language is considered solely in relation to itself, rather than being instrumentalized for other purposes. Consistent with his distinctive philosophical approach, he sought to avoid grounding language in any external justification. Consequently, language, in his view, could not be adequately explained by mere acoustic transmission or vocalization. Heidegger contended that language is inherently challenging to comprehend precisely because of our intimate proximity to it, necessitating a discourse on aspects that typically remain unarticulated due to their immediate presence. His treatise, "Unterwegs zur Sprache" (On the way to language), represents an endeavor to access "a place we already are in."
Influences
Both Friedrich Nietzsche and Friedrich Hölderlin significantly influenced Heidegger, with numerous lecture courses, particularly during the 1930s and 1940s, dedicated to their respective works. Heidegger's lectures on Nietzsche primarily analyzed fragments posthumously compiled as The Will to Power, rather than Nietzsche's formally published texts. Heidegger interpreted The Will to Power as the ultimate manifestation of Western metaphysics, rendering these lectures a form of intellectual exchange between the two philosophers.
Michael Allen Gillespie posits that Heidegger's theoretical embrace of "destiny" shares considerable commonality with Marxist millenarianism. However, Marxists contend that Heidegger's theoretical stance is antithetical to practical political engagement and implicitly supports fascism. Gillespie, conversely, argues that the genuine peril associated with Heidegger's philosophy lies not in quietism but in fanaticism. He suggests that modernity has propelled humanity towards an unprecedented objective, situated "on the brink of profound nihilism," a state so unfamiliar that it necessitates the creation of a novel tradition for its comprehension.
Gillespie infers from Heidegger's texts that humanity risks degenerating into categories of "scientists, workers, and brutes." He further asserts that Heidegger envisioned this potential decline as the most significant event in Western history, believing it could facilitate a more profound and primordial understanding of being than that achieved by the Presocratics.
Friedrich Hölderlin's poetry progressively assumed a pivotal role in Heidegger's later philosophical endeavors. Heidegger accorded Hölderlin a unique position within the trajectory of being and German history, viewing him as a prophetic figure whose insights remained largely unacknowledged in Germany and the broader Western world. Numerous Heideggerian works from the 1930s onward incorporate reflections on verses from Hölderlin's poetry, and several lecture series were dedicated to the meticulous analysis of individual poems, such as Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister".
Heidegger and the Nazi Party
The Rectorate
Adolf Hitler assumed the chancellorship of Germany on January 30, 1933. Subsequently, Heidegger was elected rector of the University of Freiburg on April 21, 1933, officially commencing his role the next day. On May 1, he formally joined the Nazi Party.
Commencing in February 1933, Heidegger actively participated, alongside Ernst Krieck, in an organization designated as the Cultural-Political Working Group of German University Instructors (Kulturpolitische Arbeitsgemeinschaft deutscher Hochschullehrer). This collective convened privately during the spring of 1933 to strategize the Nazification of the German university system.
On May 27, 1933, Heidegger presented his inaugural address, the Rektoratsrede, subtitled "The Self-assertion of the German University." This event took place in a venue adorned with swastikas, attended by members of the Sturmabteilung (SA) and distinguished Nazi Party officials.
During the subsequent summer, Heidegger delivered a lecture analyzing a fragment from Heraclitus, commonly rendered in English as "War is the father of all." His accompanying notes for this lecture are categorized under the heading "Struggle as the essence of Beings." Within this discourse, he posited that if a populace lacks an identifiable adversary, one must be fabricated; once conceptualized and recognized, those who have identified or created this enemy are then obligated to pursue its complete eradication.
From its inception, his rectorship was characterized by considerable challenges. Certain Nazi education officials perceived him as a competitor, while others regarded his initiatives as farcical. Furthermore, some of Heidegger's Nazi colleagues derided his philosophical works as incomprehensible. He ultimately tendered his resignation as rector on April 23, 1934, which was formally accepted on April 27. Heidegger maintained his affiliation with both the academic faculty and the Nazi Party until the conclusion of the war.
Philosophical historian Hans Sluga observed, "Though as rector he prevented students from displaying an anti-Semitic poster at the entrance to the university and from holding a book burning, he kept in close contact with the Nazi student leaders and clearly signaled to them his sympathy with their activism."
In 1945, Heidegger composed a reflection on his rectorship, entrusting the manuscript to his son Hermann; this text was subsequently published in 1983:
The rectorate was an attempt to see something in the movement that had come to power, beyond all its failings and crudeness, that was much more far-reaching and that could perhaps one day bring a concentration on the Germans' Western historical essence. It will in no way be denied that at the time I believed in such possibilities and for that reason renounced the actual vocation of thinking in favor of being effective in an official capacity. In no way will what was caused by my own inadequacy in office be played down. But these points of view do not capture what is essential and what moved me to accept the rectorate.
Treatment of Husserl
Commencing in 1917, the German-Jewish philosopher Edmund Husserl advocated for Heidegger's scholarship, facilitating Heidegger's appointment as his successor to the chair of philosophy at the University of Freiburg in 1928.
On April 6, 1933, Robert Wagner, the Gauleiter of Baden Province, issued a directive suspending all Jewish government employees, a measure that encompassed both active and retired faculty members at the University of Freiburg. Heidegger's predecessor in the rectorship formally communicated Husserl's "enforced leave of absence" on April 14, 1933.
Heidegger assumed the rectorship of the University of Freiburg on April 22, 1933. The subsequent week, a national Reich law enacted on April 28, 1933, superseded Reichskommissar Wagner's prior decree. This Reich law mandated the dismissal of Jewish professors from German universities, including individuals like Husserl who had converted to Christianity. Consequently, the cessation of Husserl's academic privileges did not necessitate any specific intervention by Heidegger.
By that juncture, Heidegger had ceased direct communication with Husserl, maintaining contact solely through intermediaries. Heidegger subsequently asserted that their relationship had already deteriorated following Husserl's public "settling of accounts" with both Heidegger and Max Scheler in the early 1930s.
Heidegger did not attend his former mentor's cremation in 1938, a decision he later regretted, stating, "That I failed to express again to Husserl my gratitude and respect for him upon the occasion of his final illness and death is a human failure that I apologized for in a letter to Mrs. Husserl." Subsequently, in 1941, publisher Max Niemeyer compelled Heidegger to remove the dedication to Husserl from Being and Time, though it was reinstated in post-war editions.
Heidegger's conduct concerning Husserl has generated considerable controversy. Initially, Hannah Arendt controversially asserted that Heidegger's actions contributed to Husserl's demise, labeling him a "potential murderer," an accusation she later retracted.
Post-Rectorate Period
Following the unsuccessful conclusion of Heidegger's rectorship, he largely disengaged from political activities, yet maintained his membership in the Nazi Party. In May 1934, he joined the Committee for the Philosophy of Law within the Academy for German Law, where he was active until at least 1936. This academy held official advisory capacity in drafting Nazi legislation, including the Nuremberg racial laws enacted in 1935. Notable Nazi figures, such as Hans Frank, Julius Streicher, Carl Schmitt, and Alfred Rosenberg, were also members of the Academy and served on this committee alongside Heidegger.
In a 1935 lecture, subsequently published in 1953 as part of Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger referenced the "inner truth and greatness" of the Nazi movement. He later appended a parenthetical qualification: "namely, the confrontation of planetary technology and modern humanity." Nevertheless, it was later revealed that this qualification was absent from the original lecture, despite Heidegger's assertions to the contrary. Consequently, scholars contend that Heidegger maintained his support for the Nazi party in 1935 but sought to conceal this post-war, with the added detail serving as an implicit revision of his earlier declaration.
Private notes from 1939 reveal Heidegger's strong criticism of Hitler's ideology. However, in public lectures, his comments remained ambiguous; any criticism of the regime appeared only within the broader context of endorsing its ideals. For example, in a posthumously published 1942 lecture, Heidegger critiqued contemporary German classics scholarship, stating, "In the majority of "research results," the Greeks appear as pure National Socialists. This overenthusiasm on the part of academics seems not even to notice that with such "results" it does National Socialism and its historical uniqueness no service at all, not that it needs this anyhow."
Karl Löwith, a former student, serves as a significant witness to Heidegger's sustained allegiance to Nazism during the post-rectorship era. Löwith recounted a 1936 meeting in Rome where Heidegger, aware of Löwith's Jewish heritage, wore a swastika pin. In an unpublished 1940 account, Löwith further recalled that Heidegger "left no doubt about his faith in Hitler" and asserted that his endorsement of Nazism aligned with the fundamental principles of his philosophy.
Heidegger repudiated the "biologically grounded racism" characteristic of the Nazis, substituting it with a concept of linguistic-historical heritage.
Post-War Period
Following World War II, Heidegger faced a denazification hearing, resulting in four charges, his dismissal from the university, and his designation as a "follower" (Mitläufer) of Nazism. Consequently, he was prohibited from teaching between 1945 and 1951. This prohibition significantly prompted Heidegger's increased involvement in the French philosophical discourse.
In his post-war intellectual development, Heidegger articulated a detachment from Nazism. However, his critiques of Nazism have been deemed scandalous by some, as they frequently equate Nazi war atrocities with other dehumanizing practices stemming from rationalization and industrialization, such as the treatment of animals in factory farming. For example, during a 1949 lecture in Bremen, Heidegger controversially asserted: "Agriculture is now a motorized food industry, the same thing in its essence as the production of corpses in the gas chambers and the extermination camps, the same thing as blockades and the reduction of countries to famine, the same thing as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs."
In 1967, Martin Heidegger met with Paul Celan, a Jewish poet and survivor of concentration camps. Their correspondence had commenced in 1956, culminating in Celan's Following this encounter, Celan composed an enigmatic poem, which some scholars interpret as an implicit plea for Heidegger to offer an apology for his conduct during the Nazi period.
Proponents of Heidegger, particularly Hannah Arendt, have characterized his endorsement of Nazism as a personal 'error,' a term Arendt specifically enclosed in quotation marks when discussing his political affiliations during the Nazi era. These defenders contend that this perceived misstep bears no relevance to the substance of Heidegger's philosophical contributions. Conversely, critics including Emmanuel Levinas, Karl Löwith, and Theodor Adorno assert that Heidegger's alignment with Nazism exposed fundamental deficiencies within his philosophical framework.
The Der Spiegel Interview
On September 23, 1966, Heidegger participated in an interview with Georg Wolff, a former Nazi, and Rudolf Augstein for Der Spiegel magazine. He consented to discuss his political history on the condition that the interview be published posthumously; it was eventually released as "Only a God Can Save Us" five days after his death on May 31, 1976. During this interview, Heidegger offered a two-pronged defense of his involvement with Nazism. Firstly, he asserted that no viable alternative existed, claiming that his acceptance of the rectorship at the University of Freiburg was an attempt to safeguard the institution, and indeed science broadly, from political manipulation, thereby necessitating a compromise with the Nazi administration. Secondly, he acknowledged perceiving an "awakening" (Aufbruch) that he believed could facilitate a "new national and social approach." However, he stated that his perspective shifted in 1934 when he resisted demands, under threat of dismissal, to remove faculty deans deemed unacceptable by the Nazi party, leading to his subsequent resignation as rector.
In the same interview, Heidegger characterized his 1935 lecture, which described the "inner truth and greatness of this movement," as a form of strategic ambiguity. He contended that Nazi informants attending his lectures would interpret "movement" as a direct reference to Nazism. Nevertheless, Heidegger maintained that his committed students would recognize this statement not as an endorsement of the Nazi Party, but rather as an expression of what he later clarified in a parenthetical addition to Introduction to Metaphysics (1953): "the confrontation of planetary technology and modern humanity."
Karl Löwith's eyewitness testimony from 1940 presents a two-fold contradiction to the narrative provided in the Der Spiegel interview. Löwith's account suggests that Heidegger did not make a definitive break with Nazism in 1934 and that he was prepared to consider more substantial connections between his philosophical work and his political engagement. Notably, the Spiegel interviewers failed to address Heidegger's 1949 statement, which drew a comparison between the industrialization of agriculture and extermination camps. Indeed, the interviewers lacked access to much of the evidence concerning Heidegger's Nazi sympathies that has since come to light. Moreover, Georg Wolff, one of the Der Spiegel journalists, had served as an SS-Hauptsturmführer with the Sicherheitsdienst in Oslo during World War II and had been publishing articles with antisemitic and racist undertones in Der Spiegel since the war's conclusion.
The Farías Debate
Prominent intellectuals, including Jacques Derrida, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, and Jean-François Lyotard, engaged in extensive discussions and disagreements regarding the intrinsic relationship between Heidegger's philosophical contributions and his Nazi political affiliations. These deliberations encompassed the critical question of whether Heidegger's philosophy could be disregarded, a stance specifically repudiated by Derrida. Key venues for these debates included the published proceedings of the inaugural conference dedicated to Derrida's oeuvre, titled "Les Fins de l'homme à partir du travail de Jacques Derrida: colloque de Cerisy, 23 juillet-2 août 1980," Derrida's own work "Feu la cendre/cio' che resta del fuoco," and the scholarly analyses of Paul Celan by Lacoue-Labarthe and Derrida, which predated the comprehensive studies on Heidegger's political involvement published from 1987 onwards.
The Black Notebooks
The 2014 publication of Heidegger's Black Notebooks, which were composed between 1931 and the early 1970s, revealed numerous instances of antisemitic expressions, prompting a significant reevaluation of his association with Nazism. For example, Heidegger asserted that "world Judaism is ungraspable everywhere and doesn't need to get involved in military action while continuing to unfurl its influence, whereas we are left to sacrifice the best blood of the best of our people." The notion of "world Judaism" originated in the antisemitic text The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and subsequently appeared in Hitler's Mein Kampf. In another passage, Heidegger contended that "by living according to the principle of race [Jews] had themselves promoted the very reasoning by which they were now being attacked and so they had no right to complain when it was being used against them by the Germans promoting their own racial purity." Nevertheless, these notebooks also include passages where Heidegger critically addressed biological racism and biological oppression.
A particularly noteworthy section within the notebooks comprises Heidegger's reflections on his mentor and former friend, Edmund Husserl, particularly concerning Husserl's Jewish ancestry. In 1939, merely a year following Husserl's demise, Heidegger recorded the following in his Black Notebooks:
the occasional increase in the power of Judaism is grounded in the fact that Western metaphysics, especially in its modern evolution, offered the point of attachment for the expansion of an otherwise empty rationality and calculative capacity, and these thereby created for themselves an abode in the "spirit" without ever being able, on their own, to grasp the concealed decisive domains. The more originary and inceptual the future decisions and questions become, all the more inaccessible will they remain to this 'race.' (Thus Husserl's step to the phenomenological attitude, taken in explicit opposition to psychological explanation and to the historiological calculation of opinions, will be of lasting importance—and yet this attitude never reaches into the domains of the essential decisions[....])
Donatella Di Cesare interpreted this passage as an indication that Heidegger perceived Husserl's philosophical scope as constrained by his Jewish identity. Contemporary scholarship further substantiates the profound link between Heidegger's philosophical thought and völkisch antisemitism, as evidenced in the Black Notebooks.
Personal Life
Martin Heidegger married Elfride Petri on March 21, 1917, in a Catholic ceremony conducted by his friend Engelbert Krebs, followed by a Protestant ceremony a week later attended by her parents. Their first son, Jörg, was born in 1919. In August 1920, Elfride gave birth to Hermann. Although Heidegger was aware he was not Hermann's biological father, he raised him as his own. Hermann's biological father was Friedel Caesar, a family friend and physician, who also became his son's godfather. Hermann learned of his parentage at age 14 and later became a historian and the executor of Heidegger's will.
The same year as his marriage, Heidegger initiated a decades-long correspondence with Elisabeth Blochmann, a friend of his wife. Their relationship became romantically involved during the summer of 1929. Blochmann's Jewish heritage presents a notable point of inquiry, particularly when considered alongside Heidegger's subsequent affiliation with the Nazi Party.
In 1925, the 35-year-old Heidegger commenced a four-year affair with Hannah Arendt, then a 19-year-old student. Arendt, like Blochmann, was of Jewish descent. Heidegger and Arendt mutually agreed to maintain the confidentiality of their relationship, preserving their correspondence while ensuring its inaccessibility.
Heidegger maintained an active social and intellectual life, engaging with numerous influential philosophers, authors, and academics throughout his career. His associations included figures such as Karl Jaspers, Ernst Jünger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Tillich, Rudolf Bultmann, and Hannah Arendt. He also corresponded with Carl Schmitt, who, like Heidegger, joined the Nazi Party in 1933 and served alongside him on the Academy for German Law.
Death
Heidegger passed away on May 26, 1976, in Freiburg. Several months prior to his death, he held a meeting with Bernhard Welte, a Catholic priest, professor at Freiburg University, and a former correspondent. His interment took place in the Meßkirch cemetery.
Reception
Influence
Many observers frequently regard Heidegger as one of the most important and influential philosophers of the 20th century. American philosopher Richard Rorty positioned Heidegger alongside John Dewey and Ludwig Wittgenstein as among the most significant philosophers. Simon Critchley lauded Heidegger as "the most important and influential philosopher in the continental tradition in the 20th century."
Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek has characterized Heidegger as a "great philosopher" and disputed the assertion that Heidegger's alleged antisemitism compromised his philosophical contributions. Although acknowledging and critiquing the pervasive influence of Nazism on Heidegger's oeuvre and personal life, Žižek maintains that such influences are neither fundamental for explicating Heideggerian philosophy nor adequate for its refutation. Rather, Žižek argues that an outright dismissal precludes opportunities to examine the inherent contradictions between Heidegger's theoretical principles and practical actions, and to "confront the uneasy questions he raised against such basic tenets of modernity as 'humanism', 'democracy', 'progress', etc." Furthermore, Žižek posits that the enduring significance of Heidegger's work lies in the capacity of its central tenets to persist when disassociated from their historical context and reinterpreted in subsequent periods.
France possesses a distinct and extensive tradition of engaging with and interpreting Heidegger's philosophical contributions. Given that Heidegger's ontological discourse is occasionally construed as originating from an examination of the mode of existence of individual human beings (Dasein), his philosophy has frequently been linked to existentialism. Derrida conceptualizes deconstruction as a tradition derived from Heidegger; the French term "déconstruction" was specifically coined to render Heidegger's concepts of "Destruktion" (literally "destruction") and "Abbau" (more precisely, "de-building"). Heidegger's profound influence on Sartre's 1943 work, Being and Nothingness, is widely acknowledged. Nevertheless, Heidegger himself contended that Sartre had misinterpreted his philosophical tenets.
Hubert Dreyfus integrated Heidegger's concept of "being-in-the-world" into the field of Artificial Intelligence research. Dreyfus posited that persistent research challenges, including the Frame problem, can only be resolved effectively within a Heideggerian conceptual framework. Furthermore, Heidegger's ideas significantly impacted Enactivism and Situated Robotics.
Certain scholars examining Heidegger's oeuvre identify potential avenues for intellectual exchange with philosophical traditions beyond the Western canon, especially East Asian thought. Notwithstanding perceived divergences between Eastern and Western philosophical systems, certain later works by Heidegger, notably "A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer", indeed demonstrate an inclination to foster such cross-cultural discourse. Heidegger himself engaged with several prominent Japanese intellectuals, including members of the Kyoto School, specifically Hajime Tanabe and Kuki Shūzō. Scholar Chang Chung-Yuan asserted, "Heidegger is the only Western Philosopher who not only intellectually understands Tao, but has intuitively experienced the essence of it as well." Philosopher Reinhard May identifies significant influences of Taoism and Japanese scholarship within Heidegger's writings, despite the author's lack of explicit acknowledgment. May contends that evidence suggests Heidegger occasionally "appropriated wholesale and almost verbatim major ideas from the German translations of Daoist and Zen Buddhist classics." He further remarks, "This clandestine textual appropriation of non-Western spirituality, the extent of which has gone undiscovered for so long, seems quite unparalleled, with far-reaching implications for our future interpretation of Heidegger's work."
Contemporary figures demonstrably influenced by Heidegger's philosophy include Aleksandr Dugin, a distinguished Russian far-right political philosopher.
Criticism
Husserl contended that Heidegger's Being and Time purported to address ontology but only did so within its initial pages. Lacking further contributions to an ontology independent of human existence, Heidegger subsequently shifted his focus to Dasein. While Heidegger asserted the centrality of human existence to the inquiry into being, Husserl criticized this approach as reducing phenomenology to "philosophical anthropology" and presenting an abstract and inaccurate portrayal of the human condition. Furthermore, various aspects of Heidegger's work have drawn criticism from scholars who nonetheless acknowledge his influence. Key questions raised about Heidegger's philosophy include the ontological priority, the status of animals, the nature of the religious, his perceived neglect of ethics (Emmanuel Levinas), the body (Maurice Merleau-Ponty), sexual difference (Luce Irigaray), and space (Peter Sloterdijk). A. J. Ayer, for instance, objected that Heidegger proposed expansive, overarching theories concerning existence that lacked any empirical verifiability or susceptibility to logical analysis.
In 1929, a significant debate occurred between the neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer and Heidegger during the Second Davos Hochschulkurs in Davos, focusing on the implications of Kantian concepts of freedom and rationality. Cassirer advocated for the integral role of rationality in Kantian thought, whereas Heidegger argued for the primacy of imagination. The reception of Heidegger's philosophy within Anglo-American analytic philosophy, commencing with the logical positivists, was predominantly negative. Rudolf Carnap, for example, accused Heidegger of presenting an "illusory" ontology, criticizing him for committing the fallacy of reification and for erroneously dismissing the logical treatment of language, which Carnap asserted could only result in the formulation of "nonsensical pseudo-propositions."
Hegelian-Marxist thinkers, particularly György Lukács and members of the Frankfurt School, associated the style and substance of Heidegger's thought with irrationalism and critiqued its political ramifications. Theodor Adorno, for instance, authored an extensive critique of the ideological character inherent in Heidegger's early and later linguistic usage in Jargon of Authenticity. Similarly, Jürgen Habermas denounces Heidegger's influence on contemporary French philosophy in his polemic against "postmodernism," detailed in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.
Bertrand Russell regarded Heidegger as an obscurantist, stating, "Highly eccentric in its terminology, his philosophy is extremely obscure. One cannot help suspecting that language is here running riot. An interesting point in his speculations is the insistence that nothingness is something positive. As with much else in Existentialism, this is a psychological observation made to pass for logic." According to Richard Polt, this quotation encapsulates the sentiments of many 20th-century analytic philosophers regarding Heidegger's work.
In Film
- Der Zauberer von Meßkirch (1989) is a German television documentary about Heidegger, co-directed by Ulrich Boehm and Rüdiger Safranski.
- The film director Terrence Malick translated Heidegger's 1929 essay Vom Wesen des Grundes into English, published as The Essence of Reasons in 1969. Malick's cinematic works are frequently noted for their Heideggerian sensibilities.
- The Ister (2004) is a film based on Heidegger's 1942 lecture course on Friedrich Hölderlin, featuring contributions from Jean-Luc Nancy, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Bernard Stiegler, and Hans-Jürgen Syberberg.
- Being in the World (2010) draws upon Heidegger's philosophical framework to explore the essence of human existence in a technological era. The film includes interviews with several Heidegger scholars, such as Hubert Dreyfus, Mark Wrathall, Albert Borgmann, John Haugeland, and Taylor Carman.
Notes
Notes
Bibliography
References
Works Cited
To facilitate consistent referencing, citations of Being and Time refer to the pagination of the standard German edition, which is included in the margins of both English translations, each possessing distinct merits.
Heidegger's complete works are published by Vittorio Klostermann. The Heidegger Gesamtausgabe project commenced during his lifetime, with Heidegger himself establishing the publication sequence and stipulating that the editorial principle should prioritize "ways not works." This comprehensive edition remains incomplete. Arnulf Heidegger, his grandson and a legal professional, currently serves as the executor of Martin Heidegger's literary estate.
Footnotes
Primary Sources
Secondary Sources
Archival Collections
Archival collections
- The original manuscripts of Heidegger are preserved within the archives of Loyola University Chicago.
- The Martin Heidegger Collection, approximately 1918–1976.
- A guide to the student notes derived from Martin Heidegger's lectures is available at Special Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California.
- Works by and about Heidegger (Categorization)
- Publications by and concerning Martin Heidegger are cataloged in Helveticat, the Swiss National Library's database.
- The primary repository for Heidegger's archives is the Deutsches Literaturarchiv (DLA – German Literature Archive) in Marbach am Neckar, Germany. The majority of Martin Heidegger's manuscripts are housed within the DLA's collection.
General Information
- Political Texts: Rectoral Addresses
- Korab-Karpowicz, W.J. "Martin Heidegger (1889–1976)." In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Löwith, Karl. "My Last Meeting with Heidegger, Rome 1936."
- German Heidegger Society (in German).
- Næss, A. D. E. "Martin Heidegger." In Encyclopædia Britannica.
- Heidegger, Martin. Der Spiegel Interview by Rudolf Augstein and Georg Wolff, conducted 23 September 1966; published 31 May 1976.
- Heidegger's Notebooks Renew Focus on Anti-Semitism.
- Newspaper clippings pertaining to Martin Heidegger are preserved within the 20th Century Press Archives of the ZBW.
- A concise reference guide to the English translations of Heidegger's works.
Works by Heidegger
- English Translations of Heidegger's Works
- Works by or concerning Martin Heidegger are cataloged within the Internet Archive.
