Social contract

In the fields of moral and political philosophy, the social contract refers to a theoretical construct or model that primarily addresses, though not exclusively, the legitimacy of state authority over its citizens. Originating during the Age of Enlightenment, this concept forms a foundational element of constitutionalism, even when not formally codified or established by a constituent assembly and its resulting constitution.

Proponents of social contract theory generally contend that individuals implicitly or explicitly agree to relinquish certain freedoms and submit to an authority, whether a sovereign or a majority decision, in return for the safeguarding of their residual rights or the preservation of societal order. The interplay between natural and legal rights frequently constitutes a central theme within social contract discourse. The nomenclature derives from Jean-Jacques Rousseau's 1762 treatise, The Social Contract (French: Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique), which extensively explored this notion. While precursors to social contract theory can be traced to ancient Greek and Stoic philosophy, as well as Roman and Canon Law, the theory achieved its zenith as the preeminent doctrine of political legitimacy from the mid-17th to the early 19th centuries.

Most social contract theories commence with an analysis of the human state devoid of any political structure, a condition famously designated the "state of nature" by Thomas Hobbes. Within this hypothetical scenario, individual conduct is constrained solely by personal power and moral judgment, operating under the assumption that such a 'natural' existence inherently obstructs the formation of mutually advantageous social bonds. Building upon this fundamental premise, theorists of the social contract endeavor to elucidate the rationale behind rational individuals willingly surrendering their inherent liberties for the advantages conferred by an established political order.

Key theorists of the social contract and natural rights during the 17th and 18th centuries included Hugo de Groot (1625), Thomas Hobbes (1651), Samuel von Pufendorf (1673), John Locke (1689), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762), and Immanuel Kant (1797), each offering distinct perspectives on political authority. Grotius, for instance, asserted the existence of inherent natural rights for individuals. Hobbes famously characterized human existence in a "state of nature" as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." He argued that without political order and legal frameworks, individuals would possess boundless natural freedoms, encompassing a "right to all things," thereby permitting acts of plunder, rape, and murder, leading to an incessant "war of all against all" (bellum omnium contra omnes). To avert such a chaotic state, free individuals enter into a social contract to form a political community (civil society), thereby securing safety by submitting to an absolute sovereign, whether a single ruler or a collective assembly. Despite the potential for arbitrary and tyrannical decrees from the sovereign, Hobbes regarded absolute government as the sole viable alternative to the terrifying anarchy inherent in a state of nature. Hobbes maintained that humans consent to surrender their rights to the absolute authority of government, irrespective of whether it is monarchical or parliamentary.

In contrast, Locke and Rousseau posited that individuals attain civil rights by undertaking the responsibility to uphold and safeguard the rights of fellow citizens, which necessitates the forfeiture of specific personal liberties.

A fundamental tenet of social contract theory is the proposition that legal and political orders are not inherent natural phenomena but rather human constructs. The social contract and the resultant political framework serve merely as instruments to achieve a specific objective—the welfare of the participating individuals—and their legitimacy is contingent upon their adherence to the terms of this agreement. Hobbes contended that the government itself is not a signatory to the initial contract; consequently, citizens are not bound to obey a government that proves too ineffectual to suppress factionalism and civil disorder.

Conceptual Framework of the Social Contract

A generalized model exists for conceptualizing various social contract theories, positing the following hypothetical elements:

• I denotes the "choosers within the contractual procedure," situated in the original position or the state of nature.
• I* signifies actual individuals whose interactions are governed by the contract, and who align their reasoning with I.
• R symbolizes a set of rules, principles, or institutional structures.
• M designates the deliberative environment in which I approves R.

This implies the identification of a comprehensive model.

The model posits that

I selects R within M, thereby providing I* with a rationale to uphold and adhere to R in practical application, provided that the motivations I possesses for choosing R in M are (or can be) mutually accepted by I*.

As a conceptual model, this framework represents an abstraction of diverse theories, facilitating the identification of pertinent elements across these theoretical constructs.

Historical Context

Classical Perspectives

Formulations of the social contract are documented in numerous ancient global records. For instance, the second-century BCE Indian Buddhist text, Mahāvastu, narrates the legend of Mahasammata, presented as follows:

In the nascent stages of the cosmic cycle, humanity resided on an ethereal plane, existing weightlessly in a paradisiacal state, devoid of requirements for sustenance or attire, and without private property, familial structures, governance, or legal frameworks. Subsequently, the gradual onset of cosmic deterioration led to humanity's terrestrial grounding, necessitating food and shelter. As individuals relinquished their primordial eminence, social stratification emerged, prompting mutual agreements that established private property and family units. This development precipitated theft, homicide, adultery, and other transgressions. Consequently, the populace convened and resolved to designate an individual from their midst to uphold order, in exchange for a portion of their agricultural and livestock yields. This individual was designated "the Great Chosen One" (Mahasammata) and was accorded the title of raja due to his popular appeal.

The Indian Buddhist monarch Asoka reportedly advocated for an extensive and comprehensive social contract within his rock edicts. Furthermore, the Buddhist vinaya illustrates social contracts applicable to monks; for example, when townspeople protested monks felling saka trees, the Buddha instructed his disciples to cease the activity and conform to societal norms.

Epicurus, during the fourth century BCE, evidently possessed a profound understanding of the social contract, positing that justice and law originate from mutual agreement and reciprocal benefit. This perspective is substantiated by passages from his Principal Doctrines, including the following:

31. Natural justice constitutes a reciprocal agreement designed to prevent individuals from inflicting or suffering harm.

32. Animals incapable of forming binding agreements to neither inflict nor suffer harm are devoid of both justice and injustice; similarly, this applies to human populations unable or unwilling to establish such reciprocal agreements.

33. Absolute justice has never existed; rather, justice emerges solely from agreements forged through mutual interactions among individuals across diverse locations and periods, aimed at preventing the infliction or experience of harm.

The notion of the social contract was initially introduced by Glaucon, as detailed by Plato in The Republic, BookII.

It is asserted that committing injustice is inherently good, while suffering injustice is evil, with the latter being a greater evil than the former is good. Consequently, when individuals have both perpetrated and endured injustice, experiencing both states, and finding themselves unable to evade one while securing the other, they conclude that it is preferable to mutually agree to avoid both. This leads to the establishment of laws and reciprocal covenants, wherein that which is prescribed by law is designated as lawful and just. This, they contend, constitutes the genesis and essence of justice—a median or compromise between the optimal state (to commit injustice without penalty) and the worst state (to suffer injustice without recourse). Justice, occupying an intermediate position, is thus tolerated not as an intrinsic good, but as the lesser of two evils, and is esteemed due to humanity's incapacity to perpetrate injustice with impunity. Indeed, no individual deserving of the appellation "man" would ever consent to such an agreement if capable of resistance; to do so would be irrational. This, Socrates, represents the prevailing explanation for the nature and origin of justice.

The social contract theory is also evident in Plato's dialogue, Crito. Its prominence increased significantly following Epicurus (341–270 BC), who was the first philosopher to conceptualize justice as a social contract rather than an inherent natural or divinely ordained phenomenon. Subsequently, influential thinkers in traditional political and social philosophy, including Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau, further developed their perspectives on the social contract, thereby integrating the concept more deeply into mainstream discourse.

Renaissance Developments

Quentin Skinner posits that several pivotal modern advancements in contract theory originated in the works of French Calvinists and Huguenots. Their ideas were subsequently adopted by authors in the Low Countries, who resisted Spanish rule, and later by English Catholics. Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) of the School of Salamanca is recognized as an early proponent of the social contract, having theorized natural law to constrain the divine right of absolute monarchs. These diverse groups collectively articulated concepts of popular sovereignty through social covenants or contracts. Their arguments consistently commenced with proto-"state of nature" premises, asserting that the fundamental principle of politics is the inherent freedom of all individuals from governmental subjugation.

Nevertheless, these arguments were predicated on a corporatist theory derived from Roman law, which posited that "a populus" could function as a distinct legal entity. Consequently, these theories maintained that a collective of individuals could form a government by virtue of its capacity to exert a unified will and make unanimous decisions in the absence of a sovereign authority. This particular notion was subsequently repudiated by Hobbes and other later contract theorists.

Philosophers

Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan (1651)

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) is recognized as the first modern philosopher to comprehensively articulate a contract theory. Hobbes contended that human existence in the state of nature was "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short," characterized by pervasive self-interest and a lack of reliably protected rights and agreements, which precluded the formation of a "social" order or society. This life was "anarchic," devoid of rulers or the concept of sovereignty. Individuals in this state of nature were inherently apolitical and asocial, a condition that subsequently necessitated the social contract.

The social contract was conceptualized as an event where individuals collectively agreed to relinquish certain personal rights, contingent upon others doing the same. This process culminated in the formation of the state, a sovereign entity that mirrored the previous autonomy of individuals (now subject to its governance) and was tasked with establishing laws to regulate social interactions. Consequently, human existence transcended the "war of all against all." A significant aspect of this theory is the capacity of individuals to irrevocably surrender their rights, even to a state possessing absolute authority over life and death. However, the mechanism by which such a relinquishment could occur "freely" within the state of nature—that is, under conditions of actual or potential coercion—remains an unresolved issue in the works of Hobbes and other social contract theorists. This contrasts with the concept of "inalienable rights" articulated in the U.S. Declaration of Independence, which, influenced by Locke, characterizes rights as divinely bestowed and merely safeguarded by the state. The inherent "inalienability" of a right arguably precludes its surrender under any circumstances by a rational, autonomous agent possessing such rights, a requirement often implied by social contract theories.

The state system, though emerging from the social contract, paradoxically retained an anarchic character, lacking a supreme ruler. Similar to individuals in the state of nature, who were sovereign and driven by self-interest without established rights, states subsequently operated based on their own interests in a competitive environment. This absence of a superior sovereign power, capable of enforcing a system of social-contract laws, inevitably led to conflict among states, mirroring the state of nature. Hobbes's contributions significantly influenced the development of realism theories in international relations, which posit states as the fundamental units of analysis, operating without a higher authority—a condition analogous to the "anarchy" Hobbes described in the state of nature, as further elaborated by E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. In Leviathan, Hobbes asserted that humanity requires the "terrour of some Power" to adhere to the law of reciprocity, which he summarized as "doing to others, as wee would be done to."

John Locke's Second Treatise of Government (1689)

John Locke's understanding of the social contract diverged significantly from Hobbes's, preserving only the core idea that individuals in a state of nature would voluntarily unite to establish a state. Locke posited that individuals in a natural state were morally obligated by the Law of Nature, which granted them the "power... to preserve his property; that is, his life, liberty and estate against the injuries and attempts of other men." He contended that without governmental protection against those who might inflict harm or enslave them, people would lack security for their rights and would experience constant fear. According to Locke, individuals would consent to form a state primarily to secure a "neutral judge" that would safeguard the lives, liberty, and property of its citizens.

In contrast to Hobbes's advocacy for nearly absolute authority, Locke, in his Second Treatise of Government, championed inviolable freedom within the framework of law. Locke asserted that governmental legitimacy derives from citizens delegating their absolute right to violence to the state, while retaining the inalienable right of self-defense or "self-preservation." This delegation also includes relinquishing certain other rights, such as property being subject to taxation, as deemed necessary to achieve security. By granting the state a monopoly on violence, the government functions as an impartial judge, utilizing the collective force of the populace to administer and enforce laws, thereby replacing the chaotic condition of the state of nature where each individual acted as their own judge, jury, and executioner.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Du Contrat social (1762)

In his seminal 1762 treatise, The Social Contract, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) presented an alternative social contract theory, establishing the foundations of society upon the sovereignty of the "general will."

Rousseau's political philosophy diverges significantly from the theories of Locke and Hobbes. His collectivist perspective is most clearly articulated in his elaboration of the "luminous conception" of the "general will," a concept he attributed to Denis Diderot. Essentially, the "general will" represents the collective interest of all citizens, distinct from their individual interests.

Despite acknowledging that the British might have been the freest people globally during his era, Rousseau disapproved of their representative government, and indeed, any form of representative governance. He contended that a society achieved legitimacy only when the sovereign, embodied by the "general will," served as the exclusive legislator. Furthermore, Rousseau asserted that individuals must embrace "the total alienation to the whole community of each associate with all his rights." In essence, Rousseau argued that the efficacy of the social contract necessitated individuals must surrender their rights to the collective, thereby ensuring "equal for all" conditions.

[The social contract] can be reduced to the following terms: Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and in a body, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.

Rousseau's other writings clarify that his notable assertion, "man must be forced to be free," implies the following: given that indivisible and inalienable popular sovereignty determines the collective good, an individual who rejects "civil liberty" in favor of "natural liberty" and self-interest, thereby disobeying the law, will be compelled to adhere to the collective decisions made by the populace acting as citizens. Consequently, the law, when enacted by the people as a unified body, does not restrict individual freedom but rather embodies it. The citizen, by virtue of their civic role, explicitly consents to be bound if, as a private individual, they fail to uphold their own will as articulated in the general will.

Laws, by imposing constraints on "natural liberty," signify the transition from the state of nature to civil society. In this context, legislation functions as a civilizing influence. Rousseau thus contended that the laws governing a populace contribute significantly to shaping their collective character.

Rousseau additionally examined the social contract through the lens of risk management, thereby positing that the state originated as a mechanism for mutual insurance.

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's Individualist Social Contract (1851)

In contrast to Rousseau's social contract, which is predicated on popular sovereignty rather than individual sovereignty, alternative theories advanced by individualists, libertarians, and anarchists propose agreements limited to negative rights, resulting in a state that is either highly circumscribed or entirely absent.

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865) championed a social contract concept that precluded individuals from relinquishing their sovereignty to others. He posited that the social contract did not exist between individuals and the state, but rather among individuals who mutually agreed to abstain from coercion or governance over one another, with each person retaining absolute self-sovereignty:

What really is the Social Contract? An agreement of the citizen with the government? No, that would mean but the continuation of [Rousseau's] idea. The social contract is an agreement of man with man; an agreement from which must result what we call society. In this, the notion of commutative justice, first brought forward by the primitive fact of exchange, ... is substituted for that of distributive justice ... Translating these words, contract, commutative justice, which are the language of the law, into the language of business, and you have commerce, that is to say, in its highest significance, the act by which man and man declare themselves essentially producers, and abdicate all pretension to govern each other.

John Rawls' Theory of Justice (1971)

Drawing upon Immanuel Kant's framework, which posits inherent limitations on the state, John Rawls (1921–2002), in his seminal work A Theory of Justice (1971), advanced a contractarian methodology. This approach suggests that rational individuals, situated in a hypothetical "original position" and operating under a "veil of ignorance" that obscures their personal preferences and capabilities, would collectively assent to fundamental principles of justice and legal structure. This concept also serves as a game-theoretical formalization for the principle of fairness.

David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement (1986)

David Gauthier's "neo-Hobbesian" theory posits the feasibility of cooperation between two autonomous and self-interested entities, particularly in the domains of morality and politics. Gauthier highlights the benefits of such cooperation in addressing challenges like the prisoner's dilemma. He contends that adherence by both parties to the initial agreed-upon arrangements and moral stipulations of the contract would yield an optimal outcome for each. Within his social contract model, elements such as trust, rationality, and self-interest serve to ensure fidelity and deter rule violations.

Philip Pettit's Republicanism (1997)

Philip Pettit (b. 1945), in his work Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (1997), contended that the traditional social contract theory, founded on the consent of the governed, requires revision. Rather than advocating for explicit consent, which he suggests can be artificially produced, Pettit asserts that the sole determinant of a contract's legitimacy is the absence of effective rebellion against it.

Application

Elections

Rousseau contended that the legitimacy of societal laws derives from the collective will of the citizens they represent. Consequently, adherence to these laws allows individuals to "remain free." In electoral processes, the will of the governing body is understood to reflect the collective will. Provided there is no corruption, the legitimacy of a democratic government is considered absolute.

Within a genuine democracy, public office is not perceived as a privilege but rather as an onerous responsibility that cannot be equitably assigned to one individual over another. Only the law can impose this duty upon the person selected by lot. This method ensures that conditions are identical for all candidates, and since the selection is independent of human volition, no specific application can compromise the law's universal applicability.

Conversely, other proponents of social contract theory assert that if a government fails to safeguard citizens' natural rights (as posited by Locke) or to serve society's paramount interests, individuals are justified in revoking their obedience or altering leadership through electoral processes or, if indispensable, through violent means. Locke maintained that natural rights were inalienable, thereby positioning divine authority above governmental power. In contrast, Rousseau advocated for democracy, specifically majority rule, as the optimal mechanism for ensuring societal welfare while preserving individual liberty within a legal framework. The Lockean interpretation of the social contract significantly influenced the United States Declaration of Independence.

Social Contract Theory in the Arab World

The social contract serves as a theoretical framework for analyzing a population's receptiveness to change, particularly when such change imposes significant 'pressure.' For instance, in examining the ramifications of energy price adjustments within Gulf Cooperation Council states, the social contract delineates the populace's capacity for adapting to such shifts. Elevated energy costs for domestic households can elicit detrimental effects, necessitating the sustained consent of the contract's participants. This is because, prior to these increases, resident prices were subsidized by higher charges on exported oil.

Influence on the United States Declaration of Independence

The United States Declaration of Independence was profoundly influenced by concepts derived from social contract theory, especially those articulated by John Locke. His propositions concerning each individual's inherent right to 'life, liberty, and property,' alongside the populace's 'right to revolt,' proved exceptionally impactful.

Life, Liberty, and Property

Locke's philosophical assertion that every individual possesses an inherent right to 'life, liberty, and property' served as a foundational inspiration for the United States Declaration of Independence. The Declaration famously proclaims, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” The phrase ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’ directly echoes John Locke's advocacy for humanity's natural rights to ‘life, liberty, and property.’ In his seminal work, *The Second Treatise of Government*, Locke posited that “the state of Nature (...) teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions.” This concept of a “state of nature,” representing humanity's pre-civilizational condition, underscores an innate equality and independence among individuals, a principle mirrored in the Declaration's assertion that "all men are created equal." Moreover, Locke contended that individuals “have rights to life, (...) liberty, or possessions” and that “no one ought to harm another” in these fundamental rights. The recurrence of ‘life’ and ‘liberty’—two of the three pivotal rights safeguarded by the social contract—within the Declaration demonstrates the profound impact of Locke's theory of natural human rights. The John Locke Foundation, an independent nonprofit think tank, further affirms that "Locke’s influence can be seen throughout the Declaration of Independence" through the inclusion of the phrase “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”

The Right to Revolt

Locke's concept of the "right to revolt" significantly influenced political thought. The Declaration asserts that if the natural rights of individuals are infringed upon within the framework of the social contract, "it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government." This specific use of "right" implies not merely permission for revolt, but also a moral imperative to depose a tyrannical regime. Similarly, Locke contended that individuals possess the "right to revolt" when their inherent natural rights are transgressed. As articulated by the philosopher, "Whenever the legislators endeavour to take away and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience" and subsequently acquire the "right to resume their original liberty." Essentially, should a government become tyrannical—for instance, by encroaching upon citizens' property rights or fundamental freedoms—its populace obtains the prerogative to depose it. This principle closely corresponds with the Declaration's affirmation that individuals acquire the right to "abolish" and "institute" a new government, thereby illustrating another facet of Locke's intellectual influence on the Declaration, particularly concerning the social contract.

Thomas Jefferson's Letter

In an 1825 letter, Thomas Jefferson, a principal author of the Declaration, affirmed that "Locke," alongside figures like "Aristotle, Cicero, (...) [and] Sidney," constituted significant intellectual underpinnings for the Declaration, asserting that the document's "authority rests then on the harmonising sentiments" of these authors. This explicit reference to Locke, coupled with the letter's acknowledgment of his substantial inspirational impact on the text, further corroborates the assertion that Locke's concepts, especially those related to the social contract, profoundly influenced the Declaration.

Criticism

Consent of the Governed

David Hume, a philosopher and acquaintance of Rousseau, emerged as an early critic of social contract theory, publishing his essay "Of Civil Liberty" in 1742. The second section of this essay, titled "Of the Original Contract," emphasizes that the notion of a "social contract" functions as a convenient fiction:

As no party, in the present age can well support itself without a philosophical or speculative system of principles annexed to its political or practical one; we accordingly find that each of the factions into which this nation is divided has reared up a fabric of the former kind, in order to protect and cover that scheme of actions which it pursues. ... The one party [defenders of the absolute and divine right of kings, or Tories], by tracing up government to the DEITY, endeavor to render it so sacred and inviolate that it must be little less than sacrilege, however tyrannical it may become, to touch or invade it in the smallest article. The other party [the Whigs, or believers in constitutional monarchy], by founding government altogether on the consent of the PEOPLE suppose that there is a kind of original contract by which the subjects have tacitly reserved the power of resisting their sovereign, whenever they find themselves aggrieved by that authority with which they have for certain purposes voluntarily entrusted him.

Hume contended that while the consent of the governed represented the optimal basis for governmental authority, this principle had rarely been realized in practice.

My intention here is not to exclude the consent of the people from being one just foundation of government where it has place. It is surely the best and most sacred of any. I only contend that it has very seldom had place in any degree and never almost in its full extent. And that therefore some other foundation of government must also be admitted.

Natural Law and Constitutionalism

Legal scholar Randy Barnett contends that while territorial presence within a society may be a prerequisite for consent, it does not imply assent to all societal regulations, irrespective of their substance. A further condition for consent mandates that rules align with fundamental principles of justice, safeguard natural and social rights, and incorporate mechanisms for their effective protection (or liberties). O.A. Brownson similarly explored this concept, positing the involvement of three distinct "constitutions": initially, the constitution of nature, encompassing what the Founders termed "natural law"; subsequently, the constitution of society, an unwritten and universally understood framework governing a society established by a social contract prior to governmental formation; and finally, the constitution of government, which is established through the preceding societal constitution. Therefore, a crucial prerequisite for consent is that these rules must be deemed constitutional in this specific context.

Tacit Consent

The theory of a tacit social contract posits that individuals, by residing within the territory of a society (typically governed), implicitly agree to become members of that society and submit to its governance, if applicable. This implicit consent is considered the source of governmental legitimacy.

Conversely, some scholars assert that consenting to societal membership does not automatically equate to consenting to its government. For governmental legitimacy, the governing body must be established in accordance with a constitution of government that harmonizes with the overarching, unwritten constitutions of nature and society.

Explicit Consent

The concept of an implicit social contract also encompasses the tenets of explicit consent. The primary distinction between tacit and explicit consent lies in the latter's aim to eliminate ambiguity. Furthermore, explicit consent requires a direct articulation of one's desires, followed by a clear, concise response from the other party, either affirming or rejecting the proposition.

Consensual Nature of Contracts

The will theory of contract stipulates that an agreement is not presumed valid unless all involved parties voluntarily assent to it, either tacitly or explicitly, and without coercion. Lysander Spooner, a 19th-century attorney who appeared before the United States Supreme Court and a fervent advocate for individual contractual rights, contended in his essay No Treason that a purported social contract cannot legitimize governmental actions like taxation. He argued that governments employ force against those unwilling to enter such an agreement, rendering it involuntary and thus not a legitimate contract. As an abolitionist, Spooner advanced analogous arguments regarding the unconstitutionality of slavery in the United States.

Joseph Kary posits that contemporary Anglo-American law, akin to European civil law, adheres to a will theory of contract, wherein all contractual terms bind parties because they were self-selected. This principle held less sway during Hobbes's era when he authored Leviathan; at that time, greater emphasis was placed on consideration (defined as the reciprocal exchange of benefits essential for a valid contract), and most agreements included implicit terms derived from the nature of the contractual relationship rather than explicit party choices. Consequently, it has been suggested that social contract theory aligns more closely with the contract law prevalent during the time of Hobbes and Locke than with modern contract law. Furthermore, certain seemingly anomalous aspects of the social contract, such as the notion that individuals are bound by agreements made by distant ancestors, would likely not have appeared as peculiar to Hobbes's contemporaries as they do to contemporary observers.

References

References

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• A satirical example of a social contract for the United States, presented by the Libertarian Party as a parody.
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