Utilitarianism

In ethical philosophy, utilitarianism encompasses a group of normative ethical theories advocating for actions that optimize happiness and overall well-being for all individuals impacted. Essentially, utilitarian principles promote conduct that yields the greatest benefit for the largest population. While various forms of utilitarianism possess distinct characteristics, their fundamental premise involves, to some extent, maximizing utility, typically conceptualized as well-being or analogous notions. For example, Jeremy Bentham, who originated utilitarianism, defined utility as the inherent ability of actions or objects to generate advantages, such as pleasure, contentment, and positive outcomes, or to mitigate detriments, including pain and dissatisfaction, for those involved.

In ethical philosophy, utilitarianism is a family of normative ethical theories that prescribe actions that maximize happiness and well-being for the affected individuals. In other words, utilitarian ideas encourage actions that lead to the greatest good for the greatest number. Although different varieties of utilitarianism admit different characterizations, the basic idea that underpins them all is, in some sense, to maximize utility, which is often defined in terms of well-being or related concepts. For instance, Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, described utility as the capacity of actions or objects to produce benefits, such as pleasure, happiness, and good, or to prevent harm, such as pain and unhappiness, to those affected.

As a form of consequentialism, utilitarianism posits that the morality of an action is solely determined by its outcomes. In contrast to other consequentialist frameworks, such as egoism and altruism, egalitarian utilitarianism accords equal consideration to the interests of either all human beings or all sentient life forms. Debates among utilitarian proponents have centered on several key distinctions, including whether actions should be selected based on their probable consequences (act utilitarianism) or if agents ought to adhere to rules designed to maximize overall utility (rule utilitarianism). Further disagreement exists regarding the maximization of either aggregate utility (total utilitarianism) or mean utility (average utilitarianism).

The foundational concepts of this theory are traceable to the hedonistic philosophies of Aristippus and Epicurus, who regarded happiness as the ultimate good; to the state consequentialism of the ancient Chinese philosopher Mozi, who formulated a doctrine aimed at maximizing advantages and minimizing detriments; and to the writings of the medieval Indian philosopher Shantideva. The contemporary utilitarian tradition commenced with Jeremy Bentham and was subsequently advanced by thinkers such as John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick, R. M. Hare, and Peter Singer. This framework has been applied across diverse fields, including social welfare economics, inquiries into justice, the challenge of global poverty, the ethical considerations of animal agriculture, and the imperative of mitigating existential threats to humankind.

Etymology

Benthamism, the utilitarian philosophical system established by Jeremy Bentham, underwent significant refinement by his intellectual successor, John Stuart Mill, who was instrumental in popularizing the term utilitarianism. In 1861, Mill remarked that he had "reason for believing himself to be the first person who brought the word utilitarian into use," despite acknowledging that he "did not invent it, but adopted it from a passing expression" found in John Galt's 1821 novel, Annals of the Parish. Nevertheless, Mill appears to have been unaware that Bentham himself had employed the term utilitarian in a 1781 correspondence with George Wilson and in an 1802 letter to Étienne Dumont.

Historical Background

Pre-Modern Formulations

The significance of happiness as a fundamental human objective has been a subject of extensive historical discourse. Ancient Greek philosophers such as Aristippus and Epicurus advanced various forms of hedonism. Aristotle contended that eudaimonia represents the supreme human good. Augustine similarly observed that "all men agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness." The principle of evaluating conduct based on its outcomes also permeated ancient thought. Consequentialist doctrines were initially articulated by the ancient Chinese philosopher Mozi, who introduced a framework designed to optimize advantages and mitigate detriments. Mohist consequentialism championed communal moral values, encompassing political stability, demographic expansion, and prosperity, yet it did not endorse the utilitarian emphasis on maximizing individual felicity.

Utilitarian concepts are also discernible within the writings of medieval philosophers. In 8th-century medieval India, the philosopher Śāntideva articulated that humanity should strive "to stop all the present and future pain and suffering of all sentient beings, and to bring about all present and future pleasure and happiness." Concurrently, in medieval Europe, Thomas Aquinas thoroughly examined the concept of happiness in his seminal work, Summa Theologica. During the Renaissance period, the political philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli was among the thinkers whose works integrated consequentialist principles.

18th Century

Utilitarianism, as a discrete ethical framework, crystallized during the 18th century. While commonly attributed to Jeremy Bentham's initiation, earlier scholars had articulated remarkably analogous theoretical constructs.

Hutcheson

Francis Hutcheson introduced a foundational utilitarian concept in his 1725 work, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, positing that the moral value of an action is directly proportional to the happiness it generates for individuals. Conversely, moral evil, or vice, is proportional to the suffering it inflicts. Consequently, the most virtuous action is that which yields the greatest happiness for the largest number of people, while the most detrimental action causes the most widespread misery. Hutcheson incorporated various mathematical algorithms in the first three editions of his book to "compute the Morality of any Actions," thereby anticipating Bentham's later development of the hedonic calculus.

John Gay

Some scholars contend that John Gay formulated the inaugural systematic theory of utilitarian ethics. In his 1731 treatise, Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality, Gay asserts:

happiness, private happiness, is the proper or ultimate end of all our actions... each particular action may be said to have its proper and peculiar end…(but)…they still tend or ought to tend to something farther; as is evident from hence, viz. that a man may ask and expect a reason why either of them are pursued: now to ask the reason of any action or pursuit, is only to enquire into the end of it: but to expect a reason, i.e. an end, to be assigned for an ultimate end, is absurd. To ask why I pursue happiness, will admit of no other answer than an explanation of the terms.

This pursuit of happiness is subsequently grounded in a theological framework:

Now it is evident from the nature of God, viz. his being infinitely happy in himself from all eternity, and from his goodness manifested in his works, that he could have no other design in creating mankind than their happiness; and therefore he wills their happiness; therefore the means of their happiness: therefore that my behaviour, as far as it may be a means of the happiness of mankind, should be such...thus the will of God is the immediate criterion of Virtue, and the happiness of mankind the criterion of the will of God; and therefore the happiness of mankind may be said to be the criterion of virtue, but once removed…(and)…I am to do whatever lies in my power towards promoting the happiness of mankind.

Hume

In his 1751 work, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, David Hume states:

In all determinations of morality, this circumstance of public utility is ever principally in view; and wherever disputes arise, either in philosophy or common life, concerning the bounds of duty, the question cannot, by any means, be decided with greater certainty, than by ascertaining, on any side, the true interests of mankind. If any false opinion, embraced from appearances, has been found to prevail; as soon as farther experience and sounder reasoning have given us juster notions of human affairs, we retract our first sentiment, and adjust anew the boundaries of moral good and evil.

Paley

William Paley further developed and disseminated Gay's theological utilitarianism. While some argue that Paley lacked originality, describing the philosophies in his ethical treatise as "an assemblage of ideas developed by others and is presented to be learned by students rather than debated by colleagues," his 1785 book, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, was nevertheless a mandatory text at Cambridge. Smith (1954) notes that Paley's writings were "once as well known in American colleges as were the readers and spellers of William McGuffey and Noah Webster in the elementary schools." Schneewind (1977) further indicates that "utilitarianism first became widely known in England through the work of William Paley."

The historical importance of Paley, now largely overlooked, is evident from the title of Thomas Rawson Birks's 1874 publication, Modern Utilitarianism or the Systems of Paley, Bentham and Mill Examined and Compared.

Beyond reiterating that happiness as an ultimate goal is divinely ordained, Paley also explored the role of moral rules, asserting:

[A]ctions are to be estimated by their tendency. Whatever is expedient, is right. It is the utility of any moral rule alone, which constitutes the obligation of it.

A clear objection arises: numerous actions, while potentially useful, are universally deemed morally wrong. For instance, an assassin's act might serve a specific purpose. However, the counter-argument asserts that such actions are ultimately not useful, and this lack of utility is the sole reason for their moral incorrectness.

To fully comprehend this perspective, it is crucial to recognize that the negative repercussions of actions manifest in two forms: particular and general. A particular negative consequence refers to the direct and immediate harm caused by a singular action. Conversely, a general negative consequence involves the transgression of a necessary or beneficial universal rule.

Consistency dictates that one cannot permit certain actions while prohibiting others without establishing a clear distinction between them. Therefore, similar types of actions must either be broadly sanctioned or broadly proscribed. Consequently, when the widespread allowance of specific actions would prove detrimental, it becomes imperative to establish and uphold a rule that generally forbids them.

Classical Utilitarianism

Jeremy Bentham

Bentham's seminal work, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, was printed in 1780 but remained unpublished until 1789. It is conjectured that Bentham's decision to publish was influenced by the success of Paley's Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. Despite its initial lack of widespread acclaim, Bentham's concepts gained broader exposure when Pierre Étienne Louis Dumont translated and edited selections from various Benthamic manuscripts into French. This resulted in the 1802 publication of Traité de législation civile et pénale, which was subsequently retranslated into English by Hildreth as The Theory of Legislation. However, by this point, substantial segments of Dumont's translation had already been retranslated and integrated into Sir John Bowring's comprehensive edition of Bentham's works, released incrementally between 1838 and 1843.

Potentially cognizant of Francis Hutcheson's decision to discard his algorithms for calculating maximal happiness due to their perceived inutility and reader dissatisfaction, Bentham asserted that his own methodology was neither novel nor unjustified. He argued that "in all this there is nothing but what the practice of mankind, wheresoever they have a clear view of their own interest, is perfectly conformable to," suggesting its alignment with human behavior driven by self-interest.

Rosen (2003) cautions that contemporary characterizations of utilitarianism often exhibit "little resemblance historically to utilitarians like Bentham and J. S. Mill," frequently presenting "a crude version of act utilitarianism conceived in the twentieth century as a straw man to be attacked and rejected." It is erroneous to assume that Bentham disregarded the importance of rules. His foundational text primarily addresses the principles of legislation, introducing the hedonic calculus with the declaration: "Pleasures then, and the avoidance of pains, are the ends that the legislator has in view." In Chapter VII, Bentham further articulates that "The business of government is to promote the happiness of the society, by punishing and rewarding.... In proportion as an act tends to disturb that happiness, in proportion as the tendency of it is pernicious, will be the demand it creates for punishment."

Principle of Utility

Bentham's treatise commences with a definitive articulation of the principle of utility:

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do. The principle of utility, therefore, refers to the tenet that sanctions or condemns any action based on its apparent propensity to increase or decrease the happiness of the affected party. This is equivalent to stating its capacity to either advance or impede that happiness. This principle applies universally, encompassing not only the actions of private individuals but also every governmental measure.

Hedonic Calculus

In Chapter IV, Bentham introduces the hedonic calculus, a systematic approach for quantifying the value of pleasures and pains. He posits that the intrinsic value of a pleasure or pain can be assessed based on its intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, and propinquity or remoteness. Furthermore, the calculation must incorporate "the tendency of any act by which it is produced," encompassing the act's fecundity—its likelihood of generating subsequent sensations of the same type—and its purity—its probability of not being followed by sensations of the opposing type. Lastly, the extent, defined as the number of individuals impacted by the action, must also be considered.

Categorization of Evils: First and Second Order

This raises the fundamental question of when, if ever, transgressing the law might be justifiable. Bentham addresses this in The Theory of Legislation, where he differentiates between evils of the first and second order. First-order evils represent immediate consequences, whereas second-order evils are those that disseminate throughout the community, generating widespread "alarm" and "danger."

It is true there are cases in which, if we confine ourselves to the effects of the first order, the good will have an incontestable preponderance over the evil. Were the offence considered only under this point of view, it would not be easy to assign any good reasons to justify the rigour of the laws. Every thing depends upon the evil of the second order; it is this which gives to such actions the character of crime, and which makes punishment necessary. Let us take, for example, the physical desire of satisfying hunger. Let a beggar, pressed by hunger, steal from a rich man's house a loaf, which perhaps saves him from starving, can it be possible to compare the good which the thief acquires for himself, with the evil which the rich man suffers?... It is not on account of the evil of the first order that it is necessary to erect these actions into offences, but on account of the evil of the second order.

John Stuart Mill

John Stuart Mill was educated as a Benthamite, with the express purpose of advancing the utilitarian philosophy. His seminal work, Utilitarianism, initially emerged as a three-part article series in Fraser's Magazine during 1861, subsequently being reissued as a standalone volume in 1863.

Higher and Lower Pleasures

Mill explicitly rejects a solely quantitative assessment of utility, asserting:

It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.

Mill defines the term utility as encompassing general well-being or happiness, positing that utility represents the outcome of a virtuous action. Within the framework of utilitarianism, utility specifically denotes actions undertaken for social utility, which Mill clarifies as the collective well-being of numerous individuals. In his treatise, *Utilitarianism*, Mill elucidates the concept of utility by arguing that individuals inherently seek happiness. Consequently, if each person desires their own happiness, it logically follows that a collective desire for universal happiness emerges, thereby fostering broader social utility. Therefore, the optimal action is one that yields the greatest pleasure for societal utility, aligning with Jeremy Bentham's foundational utilitarian principle of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number."

Mill posited that actions were not merely integral to utility but also served as the guiding principle for moral human conduct. Specifically, he argued that individuals ought to undertake actions solely if they generate societal pleasure. This perspective on pleasure was inherently hedonistic, asserting that pleasure constitutes life's ultimate good. Bentham subsequently adopted this concept, which is evident throughout his writings. Mill contended that virtuous actions invariably lead to pleasure, which he considered the supreme objective. He further asserted that good actions both produce pleasure and delineate virtuous character. More precisely, the assessment of character and the moral rectitude of an action are predicated upon an individual's contribution to the principle of social utility. Ultimately, the most compelling evidence of a commendable character lies in virtuous actions; consequently, any mental disposition primarily inclined towards detrimental conduct should be unequivocally dismissed as morally sound. In the concluding chapter of *Utilitarianism*, Mill posits that justice, functioning as a criterion for categorizing actions (as either just or unjust), represents a fundamental moral imperative. When these collective moral requirements are considered, they are deemed to possess greater significance within the framework of what Mill terms "social utility."

Mill additionally observes that, contrary to critical assertions, no recognized Epicurean philosophy of life fails to attribute a significantly superior value to intellectual pleasures compared to those derived from mere sensation. Nevertheless, he concedes that this prioritization often stems from the perceived circumstantial benefits of intellectual pleasures, such as "greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, &c." Conversely, Mill contends that certain pleasures possess an inherent qualitative superiority.

The critique labeling hedonism as a "doctrine worthy only of swine" possesses a considerable historical lineage. Aristotle, in Nicomachean Ethics (Book 1, Chapter 5), asserted that equating the good with pleasure implies a preference for an existence akin to that of animals. While theological utilitarians could anchor their pursuit of happiness in divine will, hedonistic utilitarians required an alternative justification. Mill's strategy involves positing that intellectual pleasures are inherently superior to their physical counterparts.

Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. ... A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable probably of more acute suffering, and certainly accessible to it at more points, than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these liabilities, he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence. ... It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question...

Mill posits that if individuals "competently acquainted" with two distinct pleasures demonstrate a definitive preference for one, even when it entails greater dissatisfaction and they "would not resign it for any quantity of the other," then it is justifiable to consider that pleasure qualitatively superior. He acknowledges that these "competent judges" may not consistently concur, stipulating that in instances of divergence, the majority's verdict should be deemed conclusive. Furthermore, Mill concedes that "many who are capable of the higher pleasures, occasionally, under the influence of temptation, postpone them to the lower," yet he asserts that "this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the intrinsic superiority of the higher." He contends that this reliance on individuals who have experienced the respective pleasures is analogous to the process required for quantifying pleasure, as no alternative method exists for measuring "the acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations." It is undeniable that an individual with limited capacities for enjoyment possesses a greater likelihood of achieving complete satisfaction; conversely, a highly-endowed being will perpetually perceive any attainable happiness, given the world's constitution, as inherently imperfect.

Mill posits that "intellectual pursuits have value out of proportion to the amount of contentment or pleasure (the mental state) that they produce." He further advocates for the pursuit of these elevated ideals, arguing that indulgence in trivial pleasures inevitably leads to dissatisfaction, boredom, and depression. Such transient gratification, Mill contends, offers only ephemeral happiness, ultimately diminishing an individual's sense of well-being due to its fleeting nature. In contrast, intellectual endeavors foster sustained happiness by offering continuous opportunities for personal enrichment through the accumulation of knowledge. He characterizes intellectual pursuits as embodying the "finer things" in life, a quality absent in trivial pursuits. Thus, Mill suggests that intellectual engagement enables individuals to transcend cycles of depression by facilitating the realization of their ideals, a benefit not afforded by petty pleasures. Despite ongoing scholarly debate regarding Mill's conception of gratification, this perspective implies a clear dichotomy in his philosophical stance.

The Justification of the Principle of Utility

In Chapter Four of Utilitarianism, Mill examines the nature of the evidence that can be adduced for the principle of utility:

The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it.... In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it.... No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness...we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.

Critics commonly assert that Mill commits several logical fallacies:

• The naturalistic fallacy, where Mill attempts to derive prescriptive 'ought' statements from descriptive 'is' statements regarding human behavior;
• The equivocation fallacy, identified in Mill's transition from the observation that something is desirable (meaning capable of being desired) to the assertion that it is desirable (meaning it ought to be desired); and
• The fallacy of composition, which posits that the individual desire for personal happiness does not logically entail a collective desire for general happiness among all individuals.

These criticisms surfaced during Mill's lifetime, soon after the publication of Utilitarianism, and endured for more than a century, although recent scholarly discourse indicates a shift in perspective. A comprehensive defense of Mill against all three accusations, with dedicated chapters for each, is presented in Necip Fikri Alican's 1994 work, Mill's Principle of Utility: A Defense of John Stuart Mill's Notorious Proof. This publication stands as the inaugural and sole book-length examination of this specific topic. Despite this defense, the purported fallacies within Mill's proof continue to be a subject of considerable scholarly interest in academic journals and edited volumes.

Hall (1949) and Popkin (1950) offer a defense of Mill against these charges, highlighting his assertion in Chapter Four that "questions of ultimate ends do not admit of proof, in the ordinary acceptation of the term," a characteristic he attributes as "common to all first principles." Consequently, Hall and Popkin argue that Mill's objective was not to "establish that what people do desire is desirable" but rather to "make the principles acceptable." They contend that the "proof" Mill provides comprises "only of some considerations which, Mill thought, might induce an honest and reasonable man to accept utilitarianism."

Following his assertion that individuals inherently desire happiness, Mill proceeds to demonstrate that happiness is the only ultimate object of desire. Mill addresses the potential counter-argument that people also desire other attributes, such as virtue. He posits that while virtue may initially be sought as a means to achieve happiness, it can ultimately become integrated into an individual's conception of happiness and subsequently be desired as an end in itself.

The principle of utility does not imply that specific pleasures, such as music, or particular exemptions from pain, like health, are merely instruments for achieving a collective state called happiness, and thus desired solely for that purpose. Instead, these elements are inherently desired and desirable; beyond serving as means, they constitute integral components of the ultimate objective. According to utilitarian doctrine, virtue is not intrinsically or originally an end in itself, but it possesses the potential to evolve into one. For individuals who cultivate a disinterested affection for virtue, it transforms into an end, becoming desired and cherished not as a pathway to happiness, but as an intrinsic aspect of their happiness.

Various explanations can be posited for this reluctance. One might attribute it to pride, a term indiscriminately applied to both the most and least commendable human sentiments. Alternatively, it could be linked to the pursuit of liberty and personal independence, a concept the Stoics effectively utilized for its propagation. The desire for power or excitement also genuinely contributes to this phenomenon. However, its most fitting designation is a sense of dignity, an inherent quality present in all human beings, manifesting in varying, though not precisely proportional, degrees relative to their higher faculties. This sense of dignity is so fundamental to the happiness of those who possess it strongly that any conflicting element could only be a fleeting object of desire.

Henry Sidgwick

Sidgwick's seminal work, The Methods of Ethics, is widely regarded as the zenith or ultimate expression of classical utilitarianism. His primary objective in this text was to establish utilitarianism upon the foundations of common-sense morality, thereby resolving the concerns of earlier thinkers who perceived a conflict between these two frameworks. Sidgwick contended that ethics fundamentally addresses the objective rightness of actions. Our comprehension of moral rectitude originates from common-sense morality, which, however, lacks a unified core principle. The broader aim of philosophy, and ethics specifically, is not to generate novel knowledge but rather to systematically organize existing understanding. Sidgwick pursued this by articulating methods of ethics, defined as rational processes "for determining right conduct in any particular case." He delineated three such methods: intuitionism, which posits various independently valid moral principles for guiding action, and two manifestations of hedonism, where moral rightness is solely contingent upon the pleasure and pain resulting from an action. Hedonism is further categorized into egoistic hedonism, which considers only the agent's personal well-being, and universal hedonism or utilitarianism, which prioritizes the well-being of all individuals.

Intuitionism posits that humans possess intuitive, or non-inferential, knowledge of moral principles that are self-evident to the individual. The benchmarks for such knowledge include clear articulation, mutual consistency among distinct principles, and expert consensus. Sidgwick argued that common-sense moral principles generally fail to meet these criteria; however, certain more abstract principles do satisfy them, such as "what is right for me must be right for all persons in precisely similar circumstances" or the notion that "one should be equally concerned with all temporal parts of one's life." The most overarching principles derived through this approach are entirely consistent with utilitarianism, leading Sidgwick to identify a fundamental harmony between intuitionism and utilitarianism. While less general intuitive principles exist, such as the obligation to uphold promises or to act justly, these are not universally applicable, and instances arise where various duties conflict. Sidgwick proposed that such ethical dilemmas could be resolved through a utilitarian framework by evaluating the consequences of the conflicting actions.

Sidgwick's broader philosophical endeavor partially succeeds in harmonizing intuitionism and utilitarianism. However, he deemed complete reconciliation unattainable because egoism, which he considered equally rational, remains incompatible with utilitarianism without the integration of religious assumptions. These assumptions, such as the belief in a personal God who administers posthumous rewards and punishments, could bridge the gap between egoism and utilitarianism. Lacking such premises, one must acknowledge a "dualism of practical reason," which represents a "fundamental contradiction" within human moral consciousness.

Twentieth-Century Developments

Ideal Utilitarianism

Hastings Rashdall initially employed the term "ideal utilitarianism" in his 1907 work, The Theory of Good and Evil, though the concept is more frequently linked with G. E. Moore. In his 1912 publication, Ethics, Moore repudiates a strictly hedonistic form of utilitarianism, contending instead that a diverse array of values merits maximization. Moore's approach aimed to demonstrate the intuitive implausibility of considering pleasure as the exclusive metric for goodness. He asserted that such a premise:

It necessitates the assertion, for instance, that a world containing absolutely nothing but pleasure—devoid of knowledge, love, aesthetic appreciation, or moral virtues—must nonetheless be intrinsically superior, more worthy of creation, provided its total quantity of pleasure were even marginally greater than that of a world where all these other elements also existed alongside pleasure. Furthermore, it implies that even if the total quantity of pleasure in each world were precisely equal, the fact that all beings in one possessed, in addition, diverse knowledge and a profound appreciation for all that was beautiful or worthy of love in their world, while none in the other possessed any of these attributes, would offer no reason whatsoever for preferring the former to the latter.

Moore conceded the impossibility of definitively proving either position, yet he maintained that it was intuitively evident that a world encompassing elements like beauty and love would be superior, even if the quantity of pleasure remained constant. He further asserted that, should an individual adopt the opposing perspective, "I think it is self-evident that he would be wrong."

Act Utilitarianism and Rule Utilitarianism

During the mid-20th century, several philosophers investigated the role of rules within utilitarian philosophy. The application of rules was already deemed essential for selecting appropriate actions, as the constant estimation of consequences appeared susceptible to error and unlikely to yield optimal results. Paley had previously advocated for the use of rules, and Mill articulates:

It is truly a whimsical supposition that, if humanity were to agree on utility as the criterion of morality, they would nonetheless remain without consensus on what is useful, and would take no measures to ensure their principles on the subject are taught to the young and enforced by law and public opinion... to consider the rules of morality as improvable is one thing; to entirely bypass intermediate generalizations and endeavor to test each individual action directly by the first principle is another.... The proposition that happiness is the end and aim of morality does not imply that no path should be established towards that goal....Nobody argues that the art of navigation is not founded on astronomy because sailors cannot wait to calculate the Nautical Almanac. Being rational creatures, they embark with it already calculated; and all rational creatures set out upon the sea of life with their minds resolved on the common questions of right and wrong.

Rule utilitarianism, however, posits a more prominent function for rules, a characteristic believed to mitigate some of the theory's most severe critiques, especially those concerning justice and the fulfillment of promises. Smart (1956) and McCloskey (1957) initially employed the designations extreme and restricted utilitarianism, ultimately adopting the prefixes act and rule. Similarly, during the 1950s and 1960s, scholarly articles both supported and opposed this emerging form of utilitarianism, a discourse that ultimately led to the establishment of the theory now recognized as rule utilitarianism. The editor of an anthology compiling these articles noted: "The evolution of this theory constituted a dialectical process of formulation, critique, response, and reformulation; the documentation of this progression effectively demonstrates the collaborative advancement of a philosophical theory."

The fundamental distinction lies in the criterion used to determine the rectitude of an action. Specifically, act utilitarianism asserts that an action is morally correct if it yields the greatest utility, whereas rule utilitarianism posits that an action is correct if it adheres to a rule designed to maximize utility.

In 1956, Urmson (1953) authored a significant article contending that Mill grounded rules in utilitarian principles. Subsequently, scholarly works have extensively discussed this interpretation of Mill. It is highly probable that Mill did not explicitly intend to establish such a distinction, leading to ambiguous evidence within his writings. A 1977 compilation of Mill's works features a letter that appears to support the classification of Mill as an act utilitarian. In this correspondence, Mill states:

I agree with you that the right way of testing actions by their consequences, is to test them by the natural consequences of the particular action, and not by those which would follow if everyone did the same. But, for the most part, the consideration of what would happen if everyone did the same, is the only means we have of discovering the tendency of the act in the particular case.

Certain educational textbooks and at least one British examination board introduce an additional differentiation between strong and weak rule utilitarianism. Nevertheless, the prevalence of this distinction within academic discourse remains uncertain. A common argument posits that rule utilitarianism ultimately converges with act utilitarianism. This is because, for any established rule, if violating it would generate greater utility, the rule can be modified by incorporating a sub-rule to address such exceptional circumstances. This refinement process applies to all exceptions, resulting in "rules" possessing a multitude of "sub-rules" corresponding to each exceptional scenario. Consequently, an agent is ultimately compelled to pursue the outcome that yields the highest utility.

Two-level utilitarianism

In his 1973 work, Principles, R. M. Hare acknowledges the convergence of rule utilitarianism with act utilitarianism, attributing this outcome to the unrestricted specificity of rules. Hare contends that a primary motivation for developing rule utilitarianism was to adequately account for the general moral principles essential for ethical education and character formation. He therefore suggests that "a distinction between act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism can be established by constraining the specificity of the rules, i.e., by enhancing their generality." This differentiation between "specific rule utilitarianism" (which, as noted, merges with act utilitarianism) and "general rule utilitarianism" constitutes the foundational concept of Hare's two-level utilitarianism.

When individuals adopt the perspective of an "ideal observer" or "play God," they employ the specific form of utilitarianism, a practice necessary for determining which general principles to endorse and adhere to. Conversely, during the process of "inculcating" moral values or when confronted with circumstances where inherent human biases might impede accurate utilitarian calculations, individuals ought to apply the more general rule utilitarianism.

Hare posits that, in practical application, individuals should predominantly adhere to general principles:

Adherence to established general principles is generally preferable, as questioning these rules in typical moral scenarios often leads to greater harm than upholding them, unless the circumstances are exceptionally unusual. Furthermore, given inherent human limitations and cognitive biases, intricate utilitarian calculations are unlikely to consistently yield optimal outcomes.

In his 1981 work, Moral Thinking, Hare delineated two contrasting archetypes. The "archangel" represents a hypothetical individual possessing complete situational knowledge, devoid of personal biases or vulnerabilities, who consistently employs critical moral reasoning to determine appropriate actions. Conversely, the "prole" signifies a hypothetical person entirely lacking critical thinking capacity, relying solely on intuitive moral judgments and, consequently, adhering to general moral rules acquired through instruction or imitation. Hare clarified that individuals are not exclusively one or the other, but rather that "we all share the characteristics of both to limited and varying degrees and at different times."

Hare refrained from prescribing specific instances for individuals to adopt either an "archangelic" or "prole" mode of thought, acknowledging that such application varies personally. Nevertheless, critical moral reasoning serves as the foundational basis for intuitive moral thinking, guiding its development and, when necessary, its revision of general moral principles. Individuals also resort to critical thinking when confronting anomalous circumstances or when intuitive moral guidelines present contradictory directives.

Preference Utilitarianism

Preference utilitarianism advocates for actions that satisfy the preferences of all affected entities. Although John Harsanyi initially introduced this concept in his 1977 work, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, it is more frequently linked with the contributions of R. M. Hare, Peter Singer, and Richard Brandt.

Harsanyi asserted that his theoretical framework drew upon several key influences:

• Adam Smith, who conceptualized the moral perspective as that of an impartial yet empathetic observer;
• Immanuel Kant, who emphasized the principle of universality, also interpretable as a criterion of reciprocity;
• Classical utilitarians, who established the maximization of social utility as the fundamental moral criterion; and
• "the modern theory of rational behaviour under risk and uncertainty, usually described as Bayesian decision theory."

Harsanyi dismissed hedonistic utilitarianism, arguing its reliance on an antiquated psychological model, as it is not self-evident that all human actions are solely driven by the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain. He similarly rejected ideal utilitarianism, stating that "it is certainly not true as an empirical observation that people's only purpose in life is to have 'mental states of intrinsic worth'."

Harsanyi posited that "preference utilitarianism is the only form of utilitarianism consistent with the important philosophical principle of preference autonomy." He further clarified this as the principle asserting that "in deciding what is good and what is bad for a given individual, the ultimate criterion can only be his own wants and his own preferences."

Harsanyi introduced two significant qualifications. First, acknowledging that individuals occasionally hold irrational preferences, he differentiated between "manifest" preferences and "true" preferences. Manifest preferences are those "manifested by his observed behaviour, including preferences possibly based on erroneous factual beliefs, or on careless logical analysis, or on strong emotions that at the moment greatly hinder rational choice." In contrast, true preferences represent "the preferences he would have if he had all the relevant factual information, always reasoned with the greatest possible care, and were in a state of mind most conducive to rational choice." Preference utilitarianism aims to satisfy these true preferences.

The second qualification stipulates the exclusion of antisocial preferences, including sadism, envy, and resentment. Harsanyi justified this by asserting that individuals holding such preferences are partially excluded from the moral community.

Utilitarian ethics posits that all individuals belong to a singular moral community. While a person exhibiting malevolence towards others retains membership, this inclusion does not extend to the entirety of their personality. Specifically, the aspect of their character that harbors hostile, antisocial sentiments must be excluded from this moral community and holds no legitimate claim in the discourse concerning the definition of social utility.

Negative Utilitarianism

In his 1945 work, The Open Society and its Enemies, Karl Popper contended that the principle of "maximizing pleasure" ought to be superseded by the principle of "minimizing pain." Popper asserted that "it is not only impossible but very dangerous to attempt to maximize the pleasure or the happiness of the people, since such an attempt must lead to totalitarianism." He further articulated:

From an ethical perspective, no symmetry exists between suffering and happiness, nor between pain and pleasure. In my assessment, human suffering inherently presents a direct moral imperative for assistance, whereas no comparable demand arises to augment the happiness of an individual who is already thriving. An additional critique of the utilitarian maxim "Maximize pleasure" is its presupposition of a continuous pleasure-pain continuum, which permits the conceptualization of pain levels as negative degrees of pleasure. However, morally speaking, pain cannot be counterbalanced by pleasure, particularly not one individual's pain by another's pleasure. Consequently, rather than advocating for the greatest happiness for the greatest number, a more tempered approach would necessitate striving for the minimal amount of avoidable suffering for all.

The specific designation negative utilitarianism was coined by R. N. Smart, appearing as the title of his 1958 rejoinder to Popper. In this response, Smart posited that the principle would logically necessitate the pursuit of the most expeditious and least agonizing means of eradicating all human life.

Countering Smart's assertion, Simon Knutsson (2019) contended that classical utilitarianism and analogous consequentialist perspectives are approximately as prone to implying the extermination of humanity. This is because such theories seemingly suggest that existing beings should be eliminated and supplanted by happier ones, if feasible. Accordingly, Knutsson posited:

The argument concerning world destruction does not constitute a valid basis for rejecting negative utilitarianism in preference to these alternative forms of consequentialism, given that comparable arguments exist against such theories that possess at least equivalent persuasive force as the world destruction argument against negative utilitarianism.

Moreover, Knutsson observed that it is arguable that other consequentialist frameworks, including classical utilitarianism, occasionally yield less tenable implications than negative utilitarianism. An example arises in scenarios where classical utilitarianism suggests the permissibility of eliminating all individuals and replacing them in a way that generates increased suffering, yet also a greater aggregate well-being, resulting in a net positive sum according to classical utilitarian calculations. Conversely, negative utilitarianism would prohibit such actions.

Several variants of negative utilitarianism exist, including:

• Negative Total Utilitarianism: This variant permits suffering that can be offset or ameliorated within the experience of the same individual.
• Negative Preference Utilitarianism: This approach circumvents the ethical dilemma of moral killing by appealing to existing preferences that such an act would infringe upon. Concurrently, it necessitates a rationale for the generation of new lives, with a potential justification being the reduction of the average degree of preference-frustration.
• Pessimistic interpretations of negative utilitarianism, which are observable within certain Buddhist philosophical contexts.

Negative utilitarianism is sometimes conceptualized as a sub-branch of contemporary hedonistic utilitarianism, characterized by its greater emphasis on the mitigation of suffering compared to the advancement of happiness. The ethical significance of suffering can be amplified through the application of a "compassionate" utilitarian metric, thereby yielding outcomes analogous to those found in prioritarianism.

Motive Utilitarianism

Robert Merrihew Adams initially introduced motive utilitarianism in 1976. While act utilitarianism mandates the selection of actions based on an assessment of which action will optimize utility, and rule utilitarianism necessitates the implementation of rules designed to maximize utility overall, motive utilitarianism employs the utility calculus to choose motives and dispositions based on their general felicific effects, with these selected motives and dispositions subsequently governing our behavioral choices.

The rationale for adopting motive utilitarianism at the individual level parallels the arguments supporting rule utilitarianism at the societal level. Adams (1976) cites Sidgwick's assertion that "Happiness (general as well as individual) is likely to be better attained if the extent to which we set ourselves consciously to aim at it be carefully restricted." Attempting to perform a utility calculation for every single instance often results in suboptimal outcomes. Proponents contend that the implementation of judiciously chosen rules at the social level and the cultivation of suitable motives at the personal level are more likely to yield superior overall results, even if this approach occasionally dictates an action deemed incorrect when evaluated against act utilitarian criteria.

Adams concludes that "right action, by act-utilitarian standards, and right motivation, by motive-utilitarian standards, are incompatible in some cases." However, Fred Feldman disputes the inevitability of this conclusion, asserting that "the conflict in question results from an inadequate formulation of the utilitarian doctrines; motives play no essential role in it ... [and that] ... [p]recisely the same sort of conflict arises even when MU is left out of consideration and AU is applied by itself." Feldman, instead, advocates for a modified form of act utilitarianism that eliminates the perceived conflict with motive utilitarianism.

Wealth Maximization

Wealth maximization, a distinct 20th-century development stemming from utilitarian thought, originates economically from the concept of "potential Pareto improvements" proposed by Nicholas Kaldor, John Hicks, and Tibor Scitovsky. Unlike traditional Pareto criteria, which mandate that no individual be disadvantaged, wealth maximization—closely associated with Kaldor–Hicks efficiency—sanctions alterations that augment the aggregate economic surplus, even if certain parties incur losses, provided that the beneficiaries could theoretically indemnify those who are negatively affected.

Within legal scholarship, Richard Posner disseminated this concept through his 1973 work, Economic Analysis of Law. This framework posits that a policy or rule is socially desirable if it generates a net increase in collective "wealth," generally quantified by individuals' willingness-to-pay for specific outcomes. Proponents assert that, by converting varied preferences into commensurable monetary values, wealth maximization offers a solution to the challenge of interpersonally aggregating "utilities." Conversely, critics contend that affluent individuals can effectively "outbid" less wealthy ones, thereby distorting results. Supporters rejoin that concerns regarding distribution can be addressed through fiscal mechanisms like taxes and transfers, allowing wealth maximization to direct efficient resource allocation within the legal domain.

Critiques and Rebuttals

Given that utilitarianism constitutes a family of interconnected theories developed over two centuries, rather than a singular doctrine, criticisms directed at it arise from diverse rationales and target various aspects.

Utility Aggregation

The critique asserting that "utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons" gained significant traction following the 1971 publication of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice. This notion is also central to animal rights advocate Richard Ryder's dismissal of utilitarianism, where he refers to the "boundary of the individual," implying that neither pain nor pleasure can transcend this personal limit.

Nevertheless, a comparable objection was articulated in 1970 by Thomas Nagel, who contended that consequentialism "treats the desires, needs, satisfactions, and dissatisfactions of distinct persons as if they were the desires, etc., of a mass person." Even earlier, David Gauthier observed that utilitarianism presumes "mankind is a super-person, whose greatest satisfaction is the objective of moral action. ... But this is absurd. Individuals have wants, not mankind; individuals seek satisfaction, not mankind. A person's satisfaction is not part of any greater satisfaction." Consequently, the aggregation of utility is rendered impractical, given that both pain and happiness are inherent to and indivisible from the individual consciousness experiencing them, thereby precluding the summation of diverse pleasures across multiple individuals.

A common counter-argument to this criticism is that while it appears to resolve certain issues, it simultaneously generates new ones. Intuitively, numerous situations exist where individuals desire to consider the numerical implications. Alastair Norcross articulated this perspective:

[S]uppose that Homer is faced with the painful choice between saving Barney from a burning building or saving both Moe and Apu from the building ... it is clearly better for Homer to save the larger number, precisely because it is a larger number. ... Can anyone who really considers the matter seriously honestly claim to believe that it is worse that one person die than that the entire sentient population of the universe be severely mutilated? Clearly not.

The differentiation between individuals might be maintained while still aggregating utility, provided that the influence of empathy on human behavior is acknowledged. Iain King supports this viewpoint, proposing that the evolutionary origins of empathy enable humans to consider the interests of others, albeit exclusively on a one-to-one basis, "since we can only imagine ourselves in the mind of one other person at a time." King leverages this understanding to modify utilitarianism, potentially bridging Bentham's philosophical framework with deontology and virtue ethics.

Philosopher John Taurek contended that the concept of aggregating happiness or pleasure across multiple individuals is fundamentally incomprehensible, asserting that the number of people affected in a given situation holds no moral significance. Taurek's primary objection centered on the inability to articulate what it means for a situation to be five times worse if five individuals perish compared to one. He stated, "I cannot give a satisfactory account of the meaning of judgments of this kind" (p. 304). He posited that each person can only experience the loss of their own happiness or pleasure. Consequently, the death of five individuals does not equate to five times the loss of happiness or pleasure, as there is no single entity experiencing this multiplied suffering. Taurek elaborated, "Each person's potential loss has the same significance to me, only as a loss to that person alone. because, by hypothesis, I have an equal concern for each person involved, I am moved to give each of them an equal chance to be spared his loss" (p. 307). Derek Parfit (1978) and other scholars have critiqued Taurek's argument, which remains a subject of ongoing debate.

The temporal aspect of calculation

A foundational critique, subsequently addressed by Mill, posited that the time required to determine the optimal course of action would likely result in the forfeiture of the opportunity to implement it. Mill countered this by asserting that sufficient time had been available to assess potential outcomes:

[N]amely, the whole past duration of the human species. During all that time, mankind have been learning by experience the tendencies of actions; on which experience all the prudence, as well as all the morality of life, are dependent...It is a strange notion that the acknowledgment of a first principle is inconsistent with the admission of secondary ones. To inform a traveller respecting the place of his ultimate destination, is not to forbid the use of landmarks and direction-posts on the way. The proposition that happiness is the end and aim of morality, does not mean that no road ought to be laid down to that goal, or that persons going thither should not be advised to take one direction rather than another. Men really ought to leave off talking a kind of nonsense on this subject, which they would neither talk nor listen to on other matters of practical concernment.

More recently, Hardin reiterated this argument, stating, "It should embarrass philosophers that they have ever taken this objection seriously. Parallel considerations in other realms are dismissed with eminently good sense. Lord Devlin notes, 'if the reasonable man "worked to rule" by perusing to the point of comprehension every form he was handed, the commercial and administrative life of the country would creep to a standstill.'"

Such considerations compel even act utilitarians to employ "rules of thumb," a term coined by Smart (1973).

Critiques of Utilitarian Value Theory

The utilitarian assertion that well-being constitutes the sole intrinsic moral value has drawn considerable criticism. Thomas Carlyle famously disparaged "Benthamee Utility," characterizing it as a system of "virtue by Profit and Loss" that reduces the "God's-world to a dead brute Steam-engine" and the "infinite celestial Soul of Man to a kind of Hay-balance for weighing hay and thistles on, pleasures and pains on." Similarly, Karl Marx, in Das Kapital, critiqued Bentham's utilitarianism for its apparent failure to acknowledge the diverse sources of human joy across varying socioeconomic contexts.

Marx further elaborated on this point, stating:

With the driest naivete he takes the modern shopkeeper, especially the English shopkeeper, as the normal man. Whatever is useful to this queer normal man, and to his world, is absolutely useful. This yard-measure, then, he applies to past, present, and future. The Christian religion, e.g., is "useful," "because it forbids in the name of religion the same faults that the penal code condemns in the name of the law." Artistic criticism is "harmful," because it disturbs worthy people in their enjoyment of Martin Tupper, etc. With such rubbish has the brave fellow, with his motto, "nulla dies sine linea [no day without a line]", piled up mountains of books.

Pope John Paul II, drawing upon his personalist philosophy, contended that a significant risk of utilitarianism lies in its propensity to treat individuals, no less than objects, as mere instruments. He articulated this concern by stating, "Utilitarianism is a civilization of production and of use, a civilization of things and not of persons, a civilization in which persons are used in the same way as things are used."

Demandingness Objection

Act utilitarianism mandates that individuals not only strive to maximize overall utility but also do so with absolute impartiality. John Stuart Mill emphasized this, stating, "As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator." Critics argue that this dual requirement renders utilitarianism excessively demanding, as it posits that the well-being of strangers holds equal moral weight to that of friends, family, or oneself. The objection highlights that "What makes this requirement so demanding is the gargantuan number of strangers in great need of help and the indefinitely many opportunities to make sacrifices to help them." Shelly Kagan further elaborates, asserting, "Given the parameters of the actual world, there is no question that ... (maximally) ... promoting the good would require a life of hardship, self-denial, and austerity ... a life spent promoting the good would be a severe one indeed."

Hooker (2002) identifies two primary facets of this problem: act utilitarianism necessitates huge sacrifices from more affluent individuals and also demands the relinquishment of personal well-being even when the collective good would be only slightly enhanced. Another perspective on this critique is that utilitarianism precludes the concept of morally permissible self-sacrifice that exceeds the call of duty. Mill unequivocally affirmed this, stating, "A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum total of happiness, it considers as wasted."

One approach to addressing this demandingness objection is to fully embrace its requirements. This stance is notably adopted by Peter Singer, who asserts:

No doubt we do instinctively prefer to help those who are close to us. Few could stand by and watch a child drown; many can ignore the avoidable deaths of children in Africa or India. The question, however, is not what we usually do, but what we ought to do, and it is difficult to see any sound moral justification for the view that distance, or community membership, makes a crucial difference to our obligations.

Conversely, other scholars contend that a moral theory so divergent from deeply ingrained moral convictions necessitates either rejection or substantial modification. Consequently, various efforts have been made to adapt utilitarianism to mitigate its ostensibly excessive demands. One such strategy involves abandoning the imperative for utility maximization. For instance, in Satisficing Consequentialism, Michael Slote advocates for a version of utilitarianism where "an act might qualify as morally right through having good enough consequences, even though better consequences could have been produced." A key benefit of this system is its capacity to incorporate the concept of supererogatory actions.

Samuel Scheffler proposes an alternative perspective, modifying the stipulation that all individuals must be treated identically. Specifically, Scheffler introduces an "agent-centered prerogative," which permits individuals to prioritize their own interests more significantly than those of others during the calculation of overall utility. Kagan posits that this approach could be warranted because "a general requirement to promote the good would lack the motivational underpinning necessary for genuine moral requirements." Furthermore, Kagan argues that personal independence is crucial for fostering commitments and close personal relationships, and "the value of such commitments yields a positive reason for preserving within moral theory at least some moral independence for the personal point of view."

Robert Goodin offers a distinct perspective, contending that the demandingness critique can be mitigated by conceptualizing utilitarianism as a framework for public policy rather than a principle of individual ethics. He posits that numerous issues emerge from the conventional interpretation, as a conscientious utilitarian might be compelled to compensate for the shortcomings of others, thereby contributing disproportionately.

Gandjour specifically examines market dynamics, analyzing whether individuals operating within markets can achieve a utilitarian optimum. He enumerates several stringent prerequisites for this outcome, including the necessity for individuals to exhibit instrumental rationality, for markets to be perfectly competitive, and for income and goods to undergo redistribution.

Harsanyi asserts that the objection fails to acknowledge that "people attach considerable utility to freedom from unduly burdensome moral obligations... most people will prefer a society with a more relaxed moral code, and will feel that such a society will achieve a higher level of average utility—even if adoption of such a moral code should lead to some losses in economic and cultural accomplishments (so long as these losses remain within tolerable limits)." Consequently, he concludes that "utilitarianism, if correctly interpreted, will yield a moral code with a standard of acceptable conduct very much below the level of highest moral perfection, leaving plenty of scope for supererogatory actions exceeding this minimum standard."

Duty-Based Criticisms

W. D. Ross, adopting a deontological pluralist viewpoint, concedes the existence of a duty to maximize aggregate good, consistent with utilitarian principles. However, Ross argues that this obligation represents merely one among several other duties, such as the imperative to uphold promises or to rectify wrongful actions, which are overlooked by a simplistic and reductionist utilitarian framework.

Roger Scruton, a proponent of deontology, maintained that utilitarianism inadequately integrates the concept of duty into ethical judgments. He presented the dilemma of Anna Karenina, who faced a choice between her affection for Vronsky and her obligations to her husband and son. Scruton remarked, "Suppose Anna were to reason that it is better to satisfy two healthy young people and frustrate one old one than to satisfy one old person and frustrate two young ones, by a factor of 2.5 to 1: ergo I am leaving. What would we think, then, of her moral seriousness?"

Quantifying Utility

A frequent critique of utilitarianism concerns the inherent difficulty in quantifying, comparing, or measuring happiness or overall well-being. Rachael Briggs observes in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

One objection to this interpretation of utility is that there may not be a single good (or indeed any good) which rationality requires us to seek. But if we understand "utility" broadly enough to include all potentially desirable ends—pleasure, knowledge, friendship, health and so on—it's not clear that there is a unique correct way to make the tradeoffs between different goods so that each outcome receives a utility. There may be no good answer to the question of whether the life of an ascetic monk contains more or less good than the life of a happy libertine—but assigning utilities to these options forces us to compare them.

When conceptualized in this manner, utility represents a personal preference, lacking any objective metric for assessment.

Special Obligations Criticism

The disregard for special obligations constitutes a long-standing critique of utilitarianism. Specifically, classical utilitarianism does not assign preferential weight to familial relationships. William Godwin, an early utilitarian and associate of Jeremy Bentham, was among the first to address this issue. In his work Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, Godwin contended that personal needs should be subordinated to the objective of achieving the greatest good for the largest number of individuals. Illustrating this principle, he applied the utilitarian maxim "that life ought to be preferred which will be most conducive to the general good" to a hypothetical choice between saving "the illustrious Archbishop of Cambray" or his chambermaid, stating:

Even if the chambermaid were my wife, my mother, or my benefactor, this would not modify the validity of the proposition. The Archbishop's life would retain greater value than that of the chambermaid; consequently, pure, unadulterated justice would invariably prioritize the more valuable life.

Utilitarianism and the Neglect of Justice

Rosen (2003) argues that asserting act utilitarians disregard rules constitutes a "straw man" fallacy. Similarly, R.M. Hare critiques "the crude caricature of act utilitarianism which is the only version of it that many philosophers seem to be acquainted with." Considering Bentham's discussions on "second-order evils," it would be a significant mischaracterization to suggest that he or other act utilitarians would endorse punishing an innocent individual for the sake of the greater good. Despite this, critics of utilitarianism frequently contend that the theory inherently permits such actions, irrespective of proponents' agreement.

The "Sheriff Scenario"

H. J. McCloskey presented a classic articulation of this critique in his 1957 "sheriff scenario":

Consider a scenario where a sheriff must choose between two courses of action: either falsely implicating a Black individual for a rape that has incited racial animosity (where a specific Black person is widely believed guilty, though the sheriff knows otherwise)—thereby averting severe anti-Black riots that would likely result in fatalities and exacerbate racial hatred between white and Black communities—or pursuing the actual perpetrator, consequently permitting the anti-Black riots to unfold, while attempting to mitigate their impact. In this situation, an extreme utilitarian sheriff would seemingly be compelled to frame the Black individual.

McCloskey's use of "extreme" utilitarianism denotes what subsequently became known as act utilitarianism. He proposes that one potential counter-argument is that the sheriff would refrain from framing an innocent Black individual due to an overarching rule: "do not punish an innocent person." An alternative perspective suggests that the riots the sheriff seeks to prevent could, in the long term, yield positive utility by highlighting racial issues and mobilizing resources to alleviate inter-community tensions. In a subsequent publication, McCloskey further elaborates:

Undoubtedly, the utilitarian must concede that, irrespective of empirical realities, it remains logically conceivable that an 'unjust' system of punishment—for instance, one incorporating collective penalties, retroactive legislation and sanctions, or the punishment of offenders' parents and relatives—could prove more beneficial than a 'just' system of punishment.

The Brothers Karamazov

Fyodor Dostoyevsky articulated an earlier iteration of this argument in his novel The Brothers Karamazov, where the character Ivan poses a challenging question to his brother Alyosha:

Answer me directly, I implore you: envision yourself constructing the edifice of human destiny, aiming to ultimately bring people happiness, peace, and repose. However, to achieve this, you must inevitably and unavoidably torture a single, tiny creature—a child—and erect your structure upon the foundation of her unrequited tears. Would you consent to be the architect under such terms? ... Furthermore, can you conceive that the people for whom you are building would agree to accept their happiness, founded upon the unjustified blood of a tortured child, and having accepted it, remain perpetually content?

Ursula K. Le Guin further explored this ethical dilemma in her acclaimed 1973 short story, The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas.

The Challenge of Predicting Consequences

Critics contend that the inherent unpredictability of consequences renders the calculations demanded by utilitarianism unfeasible. Daniel Dennett terms this phenomenon the "Three Mile Island effect," highlighting the impossibility of both assigning an exact utility value to such an event and definitively determining whether the near-meltdown was ultimately beneficial or detrimental. Dennett posits that the incident could be considered positive if it led to lessons that averted subsequent serious occurrences.

Russell Hardin (1990) refutes these assertions, contending that the moral imperative of utilitarianism—defined as "to define the right as good consequences and to motivate people to achieve these"—can be differentiated from the capacity to accurately apply rational principles. These principles, he notes, "depend on the perceived facts of the case and on the particular moral actor's mental equipment." Hardin maintains that the limitations and variability of the latter do not necessitate the rejection of the former. He further elaborates, "If we develop a better system for determining relevant causal relations so that we are able to choose actions that better produce our intended ends, it does not follow that we then must change our ethics. The moral impulse of utilitarianism is constant, but our decisions under it are contingent on our knowledge and scientific understanding."

Historically, utilitarianism has acknowledged the impossibility of achieving certainty in these domains, with both Bentham and Mill asserting the necessity of relying on the tendencies of actions to generate consequences. G. E. Moore, in his 1903 writings, articulated:

We certainly cannot hope directly to compare their effects except within a limited future; and all the arguments, which have ever been used in Ethics, and upon which we commonly act in common life, directed to shewing that one course is superior to another, are (apart from theological dogmas) confined to pointing out such probable immediate advantages... An ethical law resembles a scientific prediction rather than a scientific law; such predictions are inherently probabilistic, even if the likelihood is substantial.

Further Considerations

Average Versus Total Happiness

In The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidgwick posed the fundamental question: "Is it total or average happiness that we seek to make a maximum?" Paley observed that, despite discussing communal happiness, "the happiness of a people is made up of the happiness of single persons; and the quantity of happiness can only be augmented by increasing the number of the percipients, or the pleasure of their perceptions." He further contended that, excluding extreme scenarios like enslaved populations, the aggregate happiness generally correlates with the number of individuals. Therefore, Paley concluded, "the decay of population is the greatest evil that a state can suffer; and the improvement of it the object which ought, in all countries, to be aimed at in preference to every other political purpose whatsoever." Smart articulated a comparable perspective, asserting that, ceteris paribus, a universe containing two million happy individuals surpasses one with only one million.

Derek Parfit argues that prioritizing total happiness leads to the "repugnant conclusion," which posits that a vast population of individuals with very low, yet non-negative, utility values could be considered a superior outcome compared to a smaller population living comfortably. This implies that, under the theory, increasing the global population is morally desirable as long as total happiness continues to rise. William Shaw proposes that Parfit's dilemma can be circumvented by differentiating between potential individuals, who are not a concern, and actual future individuals, who warrant consideration. Shaw states, "utilitarianism values the happiness of people, not the production of units of happiness. Accordingly, one has no positive obligation to have children. However, if you have decided to have a child, then you have an obligation to give birth to the happiest child you can."

Conversely, evaluating a population's utility based on its average utility avoids Parfit's repugnant conclusion but introduces alternative challenges. For instance, introducing an individual with moderate happiness into a highly felicitous society would be deemed an unethical action. Furthermore, this theory suggests that the eradication of individuals whose happiness falls below the average would constitute a moral good, as it would elevate the overall average happiness. Moreover, computations derived from average utility implausibly assert that a densely populated state of suffering is preferable to a less populated one. The principle of average utility also posits that a group experiencing brutal torture would be improved by the inclusion of additional individuals who are subjected to marginally less severe torment.

Motives, Intentions, and Actions

Typically, utilitarianism evaluates the moral rectitude or impropriety of an action solely based on its consequences. Bentham meticulously differentiated between motive and intention, asserting that motives are intrinsically neither good nor bad, but acquire such designations based on their propensity to generate pleasure or pain. He further stated that, "from every kind of motive, may proceed actions that are good, others that are bad, and others that are indifferent." Mill echoed this perspective, explicitly declaring that "motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of the agent. He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his trouble."

However, the role of intention presents a more intricate scenario. In a footnote from the second edition of Utilitarianism, Mill articulated that "the morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention—that is, upon what the agent wills to do." He also stated elsewhere, "Intention, and motive, are two very different things. But it is the intention, that is, the foresight of consequences, which constitutes the moral rightness or wrongness of the act."

The precise interpretation of Mill's footnote remains a subject of scholarly debate. The interpretative challenge primarily revolves around elucidating why intentions should influence the moral evaluation of an action, given the primacy of consequences, while motives should not. One proposed explanation "involves supposing that the 'morality' of the act is one thing, probably to do with the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the agent, and its rightness or wrongness another." Jonathan Dancy, however, refutes this interpretation, arguing that Mill explicitly connects intention to the assessment of the act itself, rather than to the agent's character.

Roger Crisp offers an interpretation that references a definition provided by Mill in A System of Logic, where Mill states that an "intention to produce the effect, is one thing; the effect produced in consequence of the intention, is another thing; the two together constitute the action." Consequently, even if two actions outwardly resemble each other, they are distinct if their underlying intentions differ. Dancy observes that this explanation fails to clarify why intentions are significant while motives are not.

A third interpretation posits that an action could be viewed as a complex process comprising multiple stages, with intention dictating which of these stages are integral to the action. While Dancy favors this interpretation, he acknowledges that it might not align with Mill's own perspective, as Mill "would not even allow that 'p & q' expresses a complex proposition." Mill asserted in his System of Logic I iv. 3, regarding 'Caesar is dead and Brutus is alive', that "we might as well call a street a complex house, as these two propositions a complex proposition."

Finally, although motives may not directly determine an action's morality, this does not prevent utilitarians from cultivating specific motives if such cultivation contributes to an increase in overall happiness.

Other Sentient Beings

In An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham posited, "the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?" While Mill's distinction between higher and lower pleasures might imply a superior status for humans, he subsequently affirmed Bentham's stance in his essay "Whewell on Moral Philosophy," labeling it a "noble anticipation." Mill further elaborated: "Granted that any practice causes more pain to animals than it gives pleasure to man; is that practice moral or immoral? And if, exactly in proportion as human beings raise their heads out of the slough of selfishness, they do not with one voice answer 'immoral', let the morality of the principle of utility be for ever condemned."

Henry Sidgwick similarly examined the ramifications of utilitarianism concerning nonhuman animals, stating:

"We have next to consider who the 'all' are, whose happiness is to be taken into account. Are we to extend our concern to all the beings capable of pleasure and pain whose feelings are affected by our conduct? or are we to confine our view to human happiness? The former view is the one adopted by Bentham and Mill, and (I believe) by the Utilitarian school generally: and is obviously most in accordance with the universality that is characteristic of their principle ... it seems arbitrary and unreasonable to exclude from the end, as so conceived, any pleasure of any sentient being."

Among contemporary utilitarian philosophers, Peter Singer is prominently known for advocating that the well-being of all sentient beings merits equal consideration. Singer posits that rights are conferred based on a creature's level of sentience, irrespective of its species. He contends that humans often exhibit speciesism—a discriminatory practice against non-humans—in ethical contexts. Singer argues that speciesism cannot be justified within utilitarianism, as no rational distinction exists between the suffering of humans and nonhuman animals; consequently, all suffering should be alleviated. Singer writes: "The racist violates the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of his own race, when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of another race. Similarly the speciesist allows the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of members of other species. The pattern is the same in each case ... Most human beings are speciesists."

In his essay "On Nature," John Stuart Mill asserts that the welfare of wild animals must be factored into utilitarian judgments. Tyler Cowen further argues that if individual animals are considered carriers of utility, then the predatory activities of carnivores should be restricted relative to their victims, proposing: "At the very least, we should limit current subsidies to nature's carnivores."

This perspective, however, contrasts with deep ecology, which posits that all forms of life and nature possess intrinsic value, regardless of whether they are deemed sentient. Utilitarianism, conversely, denies moral standing to life forms incapable of experiencing enjoyment or discomfort, as it is impossible to augment the happiness or diminish the suffering of entities that cannot feel these states. Singer writes:

The capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in any meaningful way. It would be nonsense to say that it was not in the interests of a stone to be kicked along the road by a schoolboy. A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer. Nothing that we can do to it could possibly make any difference to its welfare. A mouse, on the other hand, does have an interest in not being tormented, because it will suffer if it is. If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering—in so far as rough comparisons can be made—of any other being. If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account.

Consequently, the moral worth of single-celled organisms, certain multicellular organisms, and natural phenomena such as rivers is solely determined by the advantages they confer upon sentient beings. Likewise, utilitarianism does not inherently assign intrinsic value to biodiversity; however, the benefits biodiversity offers to sentient beings often necessitate its general preservation within a utilitarian framework.

Digital Minds

Nick Bostrom and Carl Shulman posit that ongoing advancements in artificial intelligence are likely to enable the creation of digital minds requiring fewer resources and possessing a significantly greater rate and intensity of subjective experience compared to humans. These entities, termed "super-beneficiaries," might also be immune to hedonic adaptation. Bostrom advocated for identifying strategies that would facilitate the mutually beneficial coexistence of digital and biological minds, allowing all forms to prosper.

Application to Specific Problems

This concept has been applied to diverse fields, including social welfare economics, inquiries into justice, the global poverty crisis, the ethical implications of animal agriculture, and the imperative of mitigating existential risks to humanity. Regarding veracity, certain utilitarians endorse the use of white lies.

World Poverty

An article published in the American Economic Journal has explored the application of utilitarian ethics to wealth redistribution. The journal contended that taxing affluent individuals represents the most effective utilization of their disposable income, asserting that such funds generate utility for the largest number of people through the provision of government services. Numerous utilitarian philosophers, notably Peter Singer and Toby Ord, maintain that individuals in developed nations bear a particular obligation to contribute to the eradication of extreme global poverty, for instance, by consistently donating a portion of their earnings to charitable organizations. Singer, for example, posits that charitable contributions can save lives or alleviate poverty-related illnesses, representing a superior allocation of funds given the significantly greater happiness it confers upon those in extreme poverty compared to the marginal benefit experienced by individuals living in relative affluence. Furthermore, Singer advocates not only for donating a substantial share of one's income to charity but also for directing these funds towards the most cost-effective organizations, thereby maximizing overall good in alignment with utilitarian principles. Singer's propositions have fundamentally influenced the contemporary effective altruism movement.

Social Choice

Criminal Justice

References

References

Citations

Bibliography

• Nathanson, Stephen. "Act and Rule Utilitarianism." In Fieser, James; Dowden, Bradley (eds.). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 2161-0002. OCLC 37741658.
• Nathanson, Stephen. "Act and Rule Utilitarianism". In Fieser, James; Dowden, Bradley (eds.). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 2161-0002. OCLC 37741658.Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. "Consequentialism." In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 1095-5054. OCLC 429049174.Driver, Julia. "The History of Utilitarianism." In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 1095-5054. OCLC 429049174.Slater, Joe. "History of Utilitarianism." In Fieser, James; Dowden, Bradley (eds.). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 2161-0002. OCLC 37741658.Source: TORIma Academy Archive