In philosophy and metaphysics, materialism posits a monistic view where matter constitutes the fundamental substance of nature. Consequently, all phenomena, including mind and consciousness, are understood to originate from material interactions and rely on physical processes, such as those occurring within the human brain and nervous system. This perspective contrasts with monistic idealism, which regards consciousness as primary. Materialism is closely associated with naturalism, the doctrine asserting that only natural laws and forces govern the universe, and with physicalism, which maintains that all existence is ultimately physical. Physicalism broadens the scope of materialism by encompassing forms of physicality beyond conventional matter (e.g., spacetime, energy, forces, exotic matter); some scholars, however, employ these terms interchangeably.
In philosophy and metaphysics, materialism is a form of monism holding that matter is the fundamental substance of nature, so that all things, including mind and consciousness, arise from material interactions and depend on physical processes, including those of the human brain and nervous system. It contrasts with monistic idealism, which treats consciousness as fundamental, and is related to naturalism, the view that only natural laws and forces operate in the universe, and to physicalism, the view that all that exists is ultimately physical. Physicalism extends materialism by including forms of physicality beyond ordinary matter (e.g. spacetime, energy, forces, exotic matter), and some use the terms interchangeably.
Philosophical frameworks that either oppose or offer alternatives to materialism or physicalism include idealism, pluralism, dualism, solipsism, panpsychism, and various other monistic approaches.
Overview
Materialism is a philosophical doctrine asserting the primacy of matter in the world's constitution, wherein mind or consciousness either emerges as a secondary, dependent reality or is entirely absent. An extreme manifestation of materialism posits that the real world comprises solely material entities, with the crucial caveat that space and time must also be considered material if they represent realities rather than mere relational systems. As a monistic ontological theory, materialism diverges from ontological frameworks founded on dualism or pluralism. In providing singular explanations for phenomenal reality, materialism stands in opposition to idealism, neutral monism, and spiritualism. Furthermore, it may contrast with phenomenalism, vitalism, and dual-aspect monism. This doctrine can be associated with the concept of determinism, a principle advocated by Enlightenment philosophers.
In contemporary philosophical discourse, the terms "materialism" and "physicalism" are frequently used interchangeably, despite their distinct historical trajectories. The term "materialism" emerged in English towards the close of the 17th century, whereas "physicalism" was introduced in the 1930s by Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap of the Vienna Circle. They proposed it as a linguistic thesis asserting the translatability of all statements into physical language. A rationale for preferring "physicalism" stems from physics having uncovered entities that do not align with the classical definition of matter as an inert substance; for instance, forces like gravity are physical but not overtly "material" according to traditional interpretations. Contemporary philosophical materialists broaden this definition to encompass other scientifically observable entities, including energy, forces, and the spacetime continuum. Some philosophers, such as Mary Midgley, contend that the concept of "matter" itself is elusive and inadequately defined.
Non-reductive materialism
Materialism is frequently linked with reductionism, a principle positing that objects or phenomena identified at one descriptive level, if genuinely existing, must be explicable through objects or phenomena at another, typically more fundamental, descriptive level.
Non-reductive materialism explicitly repudiates this reductionist premise, maintaining that the material constitution of all particulars is compatible with the existence of real objects, properties, or phenomena that cannot be explained solely by the canonical terms used for basic material constituents. Jerry Fodor espoused this perspective, arguing that empirical laws and explanations within "special sciences" such as psychology or geology are not discernible from the viewpoint of fundamental physics.
History
Early history
Before Common Era
Materialism emerged, potentially independently, across several geographically distinct regions of Eurasia during the period Karl Jaspers designated as the Axial Age (c. 800–200 BC).
In ancient Indian philosophy, materialism evolved around 600 BC, notably through the contributions of Ajita Kesakambali, Payasi, Kanada, and the proponents of the Cārvāka school of thought. Kanada is recognized as an early advocate of atomism. The Nyaya–Vaisesika school (c. 600–100 BC) developed one of the earliest forms of atomism; however, their arguments for the existence of God and their assertion that consciousness is non-material prevent their classification as materialists. The atomic tradition was subsequently continued by Buddhist atomism and the Jaina school.
Ancient Greek atomists, including Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, foreshadowed subsequent materialist philosophies. Lucretius's Latin poem, De Rerum Natura (99 – c. 55 BC), articulates the mechanistic philosophical tenets of Democritus and Epicurus. This perspective posits that existence comprises solely matter and void, with all phenomena arising from the diverse motions and aggregations of fundamental material particles termed atoms (meaning "indivisibles"). De Rerum Natura offers mechanistic explanations for various phenomena, including erosion, evaporation, wind, and sound. Seminal principles, such as "nothing can touch body but body," originated in Lucretius's writings. Democritus and Epicurus did not advocate a monist ontology; rather, they asserted the ontological distinction between matter and space, viewing space as a distinct category of being.
Epicureanism, a materialist philosophy from classical antiquity, served as a significant precursor to modern scientific thought. Classical atomism predates Epicurus, with 5th-century BCE philosophers Leucippus and Democritus attributing all change to the collisions of indivisible atoms traversing the void. Epicureanism further developed this materialist framework. Epicurus maintained that all existence, including the mind, is composed exclusively of atoms moving within the void; to account for the convergence of parallel falling atoms, he proposed the clinamen, a minute lateral deviation that instigates collisions without recourse to supernatural intervention and does not necessarily imply genuine indeterminism.
Early Common Era
Wang Chong (27 – c. 100 AD), a Chinese philosopher from the early Common Era, is recognized as a materialist. The 6th-century Indian materialist Jayaraashi Bhatta challenged the Nyāya Sūtra epistemology in his treatise, Tattvopaplavasimha (The Upsetting of All Principles). The materialist Cārvāka philosophy seemingly ceased to exist sometime after 1400; by the 14th century, when Madhavacharya compiled Sarva-darśana-samgraha (A Digest of All Philosophies), no Cārvāka (or Lokāyata) texts were available for quotation or reference.
During the early 12th century in al-Andalus, the Arabian philosopher Ibn Tufail (a.k.a. Abubacer) explored materialism in his philosophical novel, Hayy ibn Yaqdhan (Philosophus Autodidactus), subtly anticipating historical materialism.
Modern Philosophy
In France, Pierre Gassendi (1592–1665) championed the materialist tradition, contrasting with René Descartes's (1596–1650) efforts to establish dualist foundations for the natural sciences. Subsequently, the materialist and atheist abbé Jean Meslier (1664–1729) emerged, alongside other prominent French materialists of the Enlightenment, including Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709–1751), Denis Diderot (1713–1784), Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1714–1780), Claude Adrien Helvétius (1715–1771), and the German-French Baron d'Holbach (1723–1789).
In England, materialism evolved through the philosophical contributions of Francis Bacon (1561–1626), Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), and John Locke (1632–1704). The Scottish Enlightenment philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) rose to prominence as a pivotal materialist thinker during the 18th century. John "Walking" Stewart (1747–1822) posited that matter possesses a moral dimension, a concept that significantly influenced the philosophical poetry of William Wordsworth (1770–1850).
Within late modern philosophy, the German atheist anthropologist Ludwig Feuerbach introduced a novel direction in materialism with his 1841 work, The Essence of Christianity, which offered a humanist interpretation of religion as an external projection of humanity's intrinsic nature. Feuerbach thus established anthropological materialism, a materialist variant that considers materialist anthropology to be the universal science.
Feuerbach's distinct form of materialism profoundly impacted Karl Marx, who, in the late 19th century, developed the concept of historical materialism—a foundational element for what Marx and Friedrich Engels termed scientific socialism.
The materialist conception of history posits that the foundation of all societal structures lies in the production of life's necessities and the subsequent exchange of these produced goods. It asserts that in every historical society, the distribution of wealth and the stratification of society into classes or orders are determined by the nature of production, its methods, and the mechanisms of product exchange. Consequently, the ultimate drivers of all societal transformations and political upheavals are not found in human intellect or enhanced understanding of eternal truths and justice, but rather in shifts within the modes of production and exchange. These causal factors are thus rooted in the economic conditions of a given era, rather than its philosophical doctrines.
Engels subsequently formulated a "materialist dialectic" philosophy of nature in his 1883 work, Dialectics of Nature. This philosophical perspective was later termed dialectical materialism by Georgi Plekhanov, who is recognized as the progenitor of Russian Marxism. During the early 20th century, Vladimir Lenin expanded upon dialectical materialism in his 1909 publication, Materialism and Empirio-criticism, wherein he linked the political ideologies of his adversaries to their anti-materialist philosophical stances.
Mid-19th century saw the emergence of German materialism, a more naturalistically inclined materialist intellectual tradition. Prominent figures within this school included Ludwig Büchner (1824–1899), the Dutch-born Jacob Moleschott (1822–1893), and Carl Vogt (1817–1895), despite their divergent perspectives on fundamental topics like evolution and the genesis of life.
Marxist theoretician George Novack contended that, notwithstanding the numerous named philosophical schools, philosophy ultimately resolves into a fundamental dichotomy: materialism versus idealism.
Contemporary Historical Context
Analytic Philosophical Perspectives
Contemporary analytic philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett, Willard Van Orman Quine, Donald Davidson, and Jerry Fodor, generally operate within a physicalist or scientific materialist paradigm. Within this framework, they have developed competing theories to explain the nature of the mind, including functionalism, anomalous monism, and identity theory.
Scientific materialism is frequently considered synonymous with, and commonly characterized as, reductive materialism. However, in the early 21st century, Paul and Patricia Churchland proposed a fundamentally divergent stance, at least concerning specific hypotheses, known as eliminative materialism. This perspective asserts that certain mental phenomena are entirely nonexistent, and that discourse surrounding them stems from a fallacious "folk psychology" and an illusion of introspection. A proponent of this materialist view might contend that concepts such as "belief" lack any factual foundation, akin to how folk science once attributed illnesses to demonic causes.
Positioned at one extreme of a philosophical continuum is reductive materialism, which posits that theories will ultimately reduce to factual observations. At the opposing end lies eliminative materialism, asserting that certain theories must be eliminated when confronted with novel empirical evidence. Situated between these two poles is revisionary materialism.
Conversely, Christian List contends that the presence of first-person perspectives—the experience of existing as oneself rather than another—serves to refute physicalism. List further asserts that because first-personal facts cannot supervene on physical facts, this argument invalidates not only physicalism but also the majority of dualistic theories that rely solely on third-personal metaphysics.
Continental Philosophical Traditions
Gilles Deleuze, a contemporary continental philosopher, endeavored to reconfigure and reinforce classical materialist concepts. Modern theorists, including Manuel DeLanda, who engage with this revitalized materialism, are now categorized as new materialists. New materialism has evolved into a distinct academic subfield, evidenced by university courses, numerous conferences, edited volumes, and monographs dedicated to its study. Jane Bennett's 2010 publication, Vibrant Matter, played a pivotal role in reintroducing theories of monist ontology and vitalism into a critical theoretical landscape predominantly shaped by poststructuralist theories of language and discourse. However, new materialism has faced critiques from scholars in critical race, Indigenous, and queer studies, who contend that it overlooks issues of race, gender, and colonialism. Other critics question the genuine novelty of its assertions, given that Indigenous and animist traditions have historically embraced perspectives on the agency or vitality of matter.
Alain Badiou, in his 1988 work Being and Event, formulated a materialist perspective grounded in Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. Badiou posited that mathematics, rather than physics or human perception, unveils the metaphysical framework of reality, which he characterized as pure multiplicity devoid of any foundational substance or singular unifying principle.
Quentin Meillassoux introduced speculative materialism, a philosophical stance designed to transcend "correlationism," which he defines as the post-Kantian notion that human thought is incapable of apprehending reality independently of its relationship to the perceiving subject.
Defining Matter
The intrinsic nature and precise definition of matter, similar to other fundamental concepts in both scientific and philosophical discourse, have generated extensive scholarly debate:
- Is reality constituted by a singular form of hyle, or do multiple distinct types of matter exist?
- Does matter manifest as a continuous substance capable of assuming diverse forms, as proposed by hylomorphism, or is it composed of discrete, immutable constituents, as posited by atomism?
- Does matter inherently possess intrinsic properties, aligning with substance theory, or is it devoid of such properties, akin to prima materia?
The traditional conception of matter as a tangible substance faced significant challenges with the emergence of field physics in the 19th century. The theory of relativity demonstrates the interchangeability of matter and energy, encompassing the spatially distributed energy of fields. This perspective supports an ontological view where energy functions as prima materia, with matter representing one of its manifestations. Conversely, the Standard Model of particle physics employs quantum field theory to characterize all fundamental interactions. From this standpoint, fields could be considered prima materia, and energy would then be understood as a property inherent to these fields.
The prevailing cosmological framework, the Lambda-CDM model, indicates that less than five percent of the universe's total energy density consists of the "matter" described by the Standard Model. The majority of the cosmos is instead composed of dark matter and dark energy, concerning which there remains substantial scientific disagreement regarding their fundamental composition.
The emergence of quantum physics prompted divergent views among scientists: some contended that the concept of matter had simply evolved, while others asserted that the traditional understanding was no longer tenable. Werner Heisenberg articulated this shift, stating: "The ontology of materialism rested upon the illusion that the kind of existence, the direct 'actuality' of the world around us, can be extrapolated into the atomic range. This extrapolation, however, is impossible...atoms are not things."
The conceptualization of matter has undergone transformations in response to novel scientific discoveries. Consequently, materialism lacks a fixed definition independent of the specific theory of matter upon which it is predicated. Noam Chomsky suggests that any property can be classified as material, provided that matter is defined to encompass that particular attribute.
Gustavo Bueno, a philosophical materialist, employs the term stroma as a more precise alternative to matter.
Physicalism
George Stack delineates the distinctions between materialism and physicalism as follows:
During the twentieth century, physicalism developed from positivism. This philosophical position limits meaningful assertions to physical entities or processes that are empirically verifiable or, in principle, capable of verification. As an empirical hypothesis, physicalism is open to revision, thereby differing from the dogmatic rigidity often associated with classical materialism. Herbert Feigl championed physicalism in the United States, consistently maintaining that mental states are identical to brain states and that mental terminology refers to the same phenomena as physical terminology. The twentieth century saw the proliferation of numerous materialist theories concerning the mind, accompanied by extensive scholarly debate.
However, not every interpretation of physicalism is necessarily linked to verificationist theories of meaning or direct realist perspectives on perception. Instead, physicalists generally contend that the mathematical formalism of our most advanced scientific descriptions of the world comprehensively accounts for every "element of reality." Furthermore, "materialist" physicalists assert that this formalism describes fields characterized by insentience, implying that the intrinsic nature of the physical realm is non-experiential.
Religious and Spiritual Perspectives
Christianity
Critiques and Alternative Frameworks
Perspectives from Contemporary Physicists
Rudolf Peierls, a physicist instrumental in the Manhattan Project, expressed his rejection of materialism, stating: "The premise that you can describe in terms of physics the whole function of a human being... including knowledge and consciousness, is untenable. There is still something missing."
Erwin Schrödinger asserted that consciousness is fundamentally irreducible, stating, "Consciousness cannot be accounted for in physical terms. For consciousness is absolutely fundamental. It cannot be accounted for in terms of anything else."
Werner Heisenberg contended that the emergence of quantum physics challenged atomistic materialism. He specifically posited that the identification of quantum entities as probability amplitudes, rather than discrete particles, substantiates a mathematical, Platonic realist understanding of physical reality, contrasting with a materialist perspective. Heisenberg explicitly stated, "modern physics takes a definite stand against the materialism of Democritus and for Plato and the Pythagoreans."
Quantum Mechanics
Several prominent figures, including 20th-century physicists like Eugene Wigner and Henry Stapp, alongside contemporary physicists and science communicators such as Stephen Barr, Paul Davies, and John Gribbin, have asserted that materialism is deficient, citing recent discoveries in physics, particularly quantum mechanics and chaos theory. Gribbin and Davies (1991) articulated this perspective:
The advent of quantum theory fundamentally reshaped the understanding of matter. The previous assumption that the atomic realm was merely a miniature replica of macroscopic reality was consequently discarded. Isaac Newton's deterministic model was superseded by a nebulous and contradictory interplay of waves and particles, governed by probabilistic principles rather than strict causal laws. Further developments in quantum theory suggest an even more profound shift, depicting solid matter as dissolving into peculiar excitations and vibrations of unseen field energy. Quantum physics challenges materialism by demonstrating that matter possesses considerably less "substance" than commonly perceived. Moreover, the theory of chaos, a recent and widely recognized development, further dismantles Newton's conception of matter as inert, discrete entities.
Digital Physics
The critiques articulated by Davies and Gribbin resonate with advocates of digital physics, who prioritize information over matter as the fundamental constituent of reality. John Archibald Wheeler, a physicist and proponent of digital physics, posited that "all matter and all things physical are information-theoretic in origin and this is a participatory universe." Notably, some pioneers of quantum theory, including Max Planck, expressed similar reservations, stating:
Having dedicated his entire career to rigorous scientific inquiry, specifically the study of matter, Max Planck conveyed the following conclusion from his atomic research: "There is no matter as such. All matter originates and exists only by virtue of a force which brings the particle of an atom to vibration and holds this most minute solar system of the atom together. We must assume behind this force the existence of a conscious and intelligent Mind. This Mind is the matrix of all matter."
James Jeans echoed Planck's sentiment, observing, "The Universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great machine. Mind no longer appears to be an accidental intruder into the realm of matter."
Philosophical Objections
Within his seminal work, the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant presented arguments against materialism while advocating for his transcendental idealism, also addressing subjective idealism and mind–body dualism. Kant further contended that both change and the passage of time necessitate an underlying, persistent substrate.
Postmodern and poststructuralist scholars similarly voice skepticism regarding comprehensive metaphysical frameworks. Philosopher Mary Midgley, for instance, asserts that materialism, particularly in its eliminative form, constitutes a self-refuting proposition.
Varieties of Idealism
Proponents of idealism, including figures like Hegel and Berkeley, frequently frame their arguments as critiques of materialism; notably, Berkeley's specific form of idealism was termed immaterialism. In this context, matter can be considered superfluous, as exemplified by bundle theory, and properties traditionally deemed mind-independent can be reinterpreted as subjective percepts. Berkeley illustrated this by highlighting the impossibility of directly observing matter, as all experience is fundamentally perceptual, whether internal or external. Consequently, the existence of matter can only be deduced from the perceived consistency of sensory experiences, lacking any direct empirical validation.
When matter and energy are considered essential for elucidating the physical world but insufficient for comprehending consciousness, dualism emerges. Concepts such as emergence, holism, and process philosophy endeavor to address the perceived limitations of conventional (particularly mechanistic) materialism without completely forsaking its fundamental tenets.
Materialism as a Methodological Framework
Certain critics challenge materialism not for its ontological assertion that matter constitutes the sole substance, but rather for its perceived role within an excessively skeptical, restrictive, or reductionist theoretical framework. John Polkinghorne, a particle physicist and Anglican theologian, specifically critiques what he terms promissory materialism, which refers to assertions that materialistic science will ultimately elucidate phenomena it has not yet adequately explained. Polkinghorne advocates for "dual-aspect monism" as an alternative to materialism.
Scientific materialists have faced criticism for their inability to furnish precise definitions of matter, thereby rendering the term materialism devoid of definitive meaning. Noam Chomsky contends that, given the historical precedent of new scientific discoveries influencing the concept of matter, scientific materialists exhibit dogmatism by presuming its immutability.
Notes
Notes
References
Bibliography
- Campbell, Keith. "Materialism." In *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 6, 2nd ed., Macmillan Reference USA, 2006, pp. 5–18.
- Stoljar, Daniel. "Physicalism." *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, February 13, 2001 (substantive revision May 25, 2021).
- "Materialism" . In Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 17 (11th ed.). 1911.Source: TORIma Academy Archive